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ABSTRACT
During the history, national ideologies had impact on the nation building of the states. 
The case happened to be in the middle of the nineteenth Century, with the creation of 
the New Kingdom, that of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes. New state was created in the 
Balkan Peninsula, after the fall of the two Empires, that of Ottoman Empire and that 
of Austro-Hungary. At the end of twentieth Century, national ideologies reappeared 
again and disillusioned the state. Analysis of the national ideologies that erupted in 
1991 and broke-up the Yugoslav State forms the core part of this study. Analyses are 
going to be focused as well, in the negative outcomes of the national ideologies that 
were expressed in the war of Slovenia, Croatia that of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and lastly 
in Kosova/o.
Ill
ÖZET
Tarih boyunca, milliyetçi ideolojiler ulus devletlerin kurulmasında etkili olmuştur. 
Olay, ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ortalarında yeni bir krallığın, Sırp, Hırvat ve 
SolvenyaTıların krallığının kurulmasıyla yaşanmıştır. Yeni devlet, Osmanlı ve 
Avusturya-Macaristan İmparatorluklarının yıkılmasından sonra Balkan 
Yarıdamadası’nda kurulmuştur. Yirminci yüzyılın sonunda, milliyetçi ideolojiler 
yeniden ortaya çıkmış ve bu devleti parçalamıştır. 1991’de ortaya çıkan ve Yugoslav 
Devleti’ni parçalayan milliyetçi ideolojinin analizi bu çalışmanın ana amacını 
oluşturmaktadır. Analiz; Slovenya, Hırvatistan, Bosna-Hersek ve son olarak da 
Kosova’da savaşlarla ortaya çıkan milliyetçi ideolojinin olumsuz sonuçları üzerinde 
yoğunlaşacaktır.
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INTRODUCTION
The dissolution of Yugoslavia, has been one the most important events, that has 
shaken Europe after the Cold War. The dissolution of Yugoslavia for many 
scholars had been an issue to focus on, with particular interest. This interest was 
not only due to the wars that swept the country and caused a human tragedy, but 
because of the reluctance of the international community to intervene and stop the 
bloodshed. This was, particularly intriguing for me which led me to work on the 
dissolution. Why did it happen? When compared to the other Eastern Socialist 
countries, Yugoslavia was always one step further, while in the critic moments of 
the transition, all this states transcended the turbulent phase and went towards 
democracy, but it was only Yugoslavia that plunged into the civil war. For that 
matter, why the dissolution happened and the causes of the dissolution were my 
main preoccupations, and will constitute the main part of this study. While 
consequences are effects of these causes, and will be explained with the war of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the case of Kosova/o as a special issue 
in the process of the dissolution will be treated in the last chapter, especially the 
question of how Kosova/o will have an impact on the further dissolution of 
Yugoslavia ( FRY: Serbia and Montenegro), has been answered.
Conflict in former Yugoslavia that erupted in 1991, essentially was as a result of 
nationalism, or better to say, result of emergence of competing national ideologies 
over the territory for their respective national groups. If we analyze the appearance 
of nationalism, we could say that, as a phenomenon, it contains two characteristics.
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One with a positive attitude, and the other with a negative attitude. Nationalism has 
positive impact when it leads to the self- designation of the national identity. 
Opposite of that, nationalism gains negative characteristics when it is presented in 
that form that could be tantamount with ethnocentrism. The negative form is 
presented with the negative attitude towards other nations, considering the own 
nation as superior in relations with others. Nationalism that has positive 
characteristics could be part of a democratic process, while opposite of that, the 
negative characteristics could impede the democracy. When the matters are former 
communist societies, it would very easily lead to totalitarism. The best case on the 
explanation of these forms of nationalism is the former Yugoslavia. Nationalism 
had impact on national awakening in the middle of nineteenth centuries and 
created the first state of Yugoslavia, while in the last decade of the twentieth 
nationalism disillusioned this state.
This study attempts to trace the line of nationalism that as a pivotal force, 
dominated the political scene at the late 80s, and created a situation that led to the 
break-up of nations. To elucidate the causes of a manifestation of nationalism of 
that time, what is needed is to give an overview of nationalism that appeared from 
the middle of the nineteenth century, and how this nationalism ignited the 
formation of the first Yugoslavia or Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. This matter 
will be explained in the first chapter. In this chapter we are not going to evaluate 
and give a deep analyses of the nationalism, but this issue would be examined so as 
to see the impact that it had on the running of the state apparatus of the Kingdom, 
and to analyze whether this breath of nationalism still exist in a different format in 
the 80s. To confirm this links, the best example would be to illustrate the program 
of Ilija Garasanin (1844), named as " Nacertanije". We shall not discuss the
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program but only to mention it so as to have a clear view on Serbia's national 
programs, and involvement of Serbian intellectuals in the policy of 80s, especially 
in the last draft in form of a Memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts and 
Science, and the goals set for. To get into our main point, namely the causes of 
dissolution, we have to present a state of Yugoslavia after the civil war 1941-45, 
established under the leadership of Tito. How he was running this state and how 
this state functioned, how the national question was resolved, and the status of 
Albanians, shall be discussed in the second chapter.
Tito's Yugoslavia was established according to the principles of Socialist 
Federative System, comprising six republics and two autonomous provinces. The 
very genesis of this new state were based utterly on the model of the Soviet Union. 
After the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform of the Soviet Union in 
1948, or as it was called the "expulsion for power", Tito eho.se an independent 
path, that of self management, that made this state distinguishable from the other 
socialist one. Tito's socialist system advanced rapidly compared to others socialist 
states. The privileged status of Yugoslavia helped decisively the geostrategic 
position, playing the role of "buffer zone" between the East and West, and the non- 
aligned movement, without being a participant neither in "Warsaw Pact", nor in 
“NATO”. During this time state of Yugoslavia was a single state in which different 
national group cohabited. The national question, as the fragile issue, in Tito's 
Yugoslavia, from the CPY ( The Communist Party) was regarded as resolved in a 
perfect manner, but in fact it was not. Even during Tito's time nationalism raised its 
head. The form in which they were manifested will be analyzed, in order to see, 
how this nationalism, after the death of Tito was performed in much more a brutal
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sense, and the impact that it had on the dissolution. We will also discuss the 
position of Albanians in Yugoslavia during this time.
As long as Tito was alive, the socialist system functioned. Tito was the 
unquestioned arbitrator that ensured the unity of the state. After the death of Tito, 
the unsatisfied voices were raised. Some of the authors discuss, these grievances 
found fertile ground in the economic crises. For them, economic crises that 
exacerbated the Yugoslav system was the main cause that led the euphoria 
towards the dissolution. Some other authors argued that the main cause of these 
crises were of a political nature. How the economic factor along with self­
management and the political one are interrelated in the Yugoslav crises, will be 
discussed in the third chapter. In this part we will give a brief overview of 
influence of the Kosova/o issue on the political crises. As we will see Kosova/o 
and Albanians were often sacrificed if not always, by other former Yugoslav 
republics, when it come to preserve their interest visa-a-vise Serbia. But for sure, 
the arrival of Milosevic in the political scene accelerated the negative course of 
events. How the policy of Milosevic had impact on the Serb nationalism, will be 
discussed in this chapter.
The outcome of this national euphoria was expressed in the first multiparty 
elections. Chapter III is reserved for explaining how these elections would affect 
the dissolution of the state, negotiations for the transformation of the state, the wars 
that swept republics, and at the end the Kosova/o case. Some of the authors argue 
that all the nationalist bear the same responsibility for the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia. These authors consider that Tudjman and Milosevic are equally guilty 
of the bloody dissolution. However closer examination of the dissolution seems to
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suggest that perhaps Milosevic did not leave any room for diplomatic maneuver. 
The plan offered, for instance from the north ( Slovenia, Croatia), was based on 
the principles of European models. This model ran counter to the intentions of 
Milosevic. This chapter tries to examine closely the tern of events and the 
consequences.
And the last part is reserved for our conclusions.
- Note, Kosova/o, both Albanian and Serbian spelling of the name are going to be 
used in this work for the sake of the impartiality.
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CHAPTER I : THE HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVISM AND CREATION OF
THE FIRST (KINGDOM) YUGOSLAVIA
l.l. On the Eve of the First World War and the Yugoslav Idea
"The past is indivisible from the future". These words by Cicero can be used as a 
guide to explain the links of the causes and consequences of the fatal break-up of 
the first Yugoslavia and the second one. In order to explain the break-up of the 
state, we will start with the creation of the first Yugoslavia in conjunction with the 
international environment of the time.
From the middle of the nineteenth century, nationalism was a strong force that 
prevailed in Europe for the new emerging states in consolidating their identity afier 
the decay of two empires, that of Ottomans, and after, that of the Austro-Hungary 
Empire. Intrinsic to the Balkan peninsula was the nation-state formation that would 
be rendered much more difficult than in other Europeans regions as will be 
discussed. Despite the problems in state formation, new entity of Yugoslavia 
created in the Balkan peninsula after the fall of the two empires became a very 
attractive place for the major powers which started to seek their piece of interest in 
the way they could grab. 1
The Ottoman Empire started decaying first. In Serbia, as the principal entity, in the
1 Uwe Nerlich, “Balkan Security in the European Post-Cold War : Challanges and the Policy 
Choices for the West”, The Volatile Powder Keg, Balkan Security in the European post Cold War 
Environment, 1994, (ed. by).F.Stephen Larrabe, Rand p.275
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creation of Yugoslav state, the national awakening was the earliest. The first 
insurrection began in 1804 under the leadership of Karadjordje, and the second in 
1815 under his successor Milos Obrenovic. With Russian backing they were able 
to secure Ottoman recognition of certain autonomous rights, and in 1830 gained 
full autonomy.2 From this time, onwards the Serbs started establishing their 
institutions as well as formulating their national goals. The Serbs would be the 
only nation in former Yugoslavia to guide the political aims of theirs through 
nationalist programs.
In a different way, the former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the 
Croats, and the second actor in creation of the Yugoslav state, strove for a common 
state of the South Slavs based on their separate national identity within traditional 
(historic) boundaries. 3 Among the Croats, the Yugoslav idea based on the South 
Slav unity and cooperation was very old. The idea has to be understood in the 
context of awakening the national ideologies that began forming during the last 
quarter of the eighteenth Century. The fervent advocator in the dispersion of the 
ideas was the energetic figure of Ludevit Gay (1809-1872), the leader of the so- 
called Illyrian Movement. The Movement was named "Illyrian" since he believed 
that the Croats were descendants of the ancient Illyrians. For him, the comer stone 
in construction of a single national south Slavic state was considered the 
language4. These ideas, based on the creation of a common state for all the Slavs,
2 For Serbian National Awakening consult;
Charles Jelavich, 1990, South Slav Nationalism, Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before ¡914 . Ohio 
State University Press, p.7-15 ; Wayne S. Vuchinich (eds.),1982, The First Serbian Uprising, ¡804- 
1813, Atlantic Research Publication; Stevan K. Pavlovich, 1999, A History o f the Balkans 1804- 
1945, Longman, London and New York,pp.200-20
3 For Croatian national Awakening see:
Ivo Banac, 1984, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History, Policy, Cornell 
U n iv ersity  Press pp.60-80
4 ibid,pp.76
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did not have very much support among the Serbs. For some, these ideas were very 
hostile and were seen as an obstacle and "calculated to stop the expansion of the 
Serbia national consciousness to its rightful limits".3 The attitude toward Slavic 
cooperation in a new state for the Serbs was not acceptable since Vuk Karadjic, 
enlightened father of the Serbs, and Garasanin, the author of " Nacertcmje " ( the 
“Outline” ) had already disseminated ideas to the Serbs, that they should create a 
Slav state in which the Serbs should rule. This nationalism, fostered among the 
Serbs certainly differed from the nationalism cultivated in the North by Croatia and 
Slovenia.
Vuk Karadjic, the enlightened father of the Serbs, had a deep impact in boosting 
for the future nationalism among the Serbs. He laid down projects of Greater 
Serbia.5 6 These projects were based on the manipulation of the language along line 
of the dialects spoken in the territory of Serbia and Croatia. Along this line, 
Karadjic’s ideas for a new Serb state were based on the stokavski dialect 
considering that the future Serbian state should encompass not only the Orthodox 
Serbs but also the populated areas in Croatian territories, excluding Zagreb, the 
center of Croatia, that spoke jekavski dialect. In explaining his view, Vuk 
Karaxhiq used Albanian nationality as a model. He argued that for the Albanians 
the religion is far less important than their common, that is, the Albanian 
nationality.7 Garasanin, the interior minister of the time (1844), in the same manner 
came up with the idea of a strong Serbian state and the idea that the Serbs should
5 Tim Judah, 1997, The Serbs History, Myth and the Destruction o f Yugoslavia, Yale University 
Press New Haven and London, cit. pp.62
6 Duncan Wilson, 1970, The Life and Times o f Vuk Stefanovic Karadzic 1787-1864, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, pp.301
7 Micheál Micheál Petrovich, 1988, Karadzic and Nationalism, Serbian Studies, vol.4 no. 3 Spring, 
pp.41-57
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dominate regions gradually that were freed from the Turks and later from the 
Habsburgs.8
From this time onwards, until the break-up of the Second Yugoslavia, these ideas 
of Vuk Karadjic and Garasanin were nurtured for the construction of the future 
state of Serbia, with the aim of creating the Greater Serbia through territorial 
expansion by ethnically cleansing the non-Serbs who were considered as foreign 
elements. For the first time the idea “ethnic cleansing” was used by Vuk Karadjic 
himself as far back as 1806. He used the term to explain the expulsion of the Turks 
after the capture of Belgrade from them that year. The ideas had ramifications for 
the future. The Greater Serbia project entered this century accompanied in blood. 
All the political parties in Serbia save the Social Democrats supported the idea at 
the beginning of this century, almost in the same way as they had done it since the 
outset of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. 9
Nationalism in state-formation of Eastern Europe differed very much from the 
Western one. Western nationalism was based on the ideas of liberty, equality, 
brotherhood and liberal democracy, accompanied with the ideas on 
constitutionalism, parlamentiarism and tolerance. The ideas constituted a basis for 
an open and democratic society of the future. When these enlightened ideas were 
transplanted into the context of emerging states of Eastern Europe they were 
blurred in a search for the past myths and dreams. In this way the course of state 
formation was opposite from that already finished in the Western parts of Europe.
8 David Mackenzie, 1985 Jlya Garasanin, Balkan Bismarck , Boulder Colo: East European 
Monographs, 1985, pp. 42-61,296
9 Aleksandar Pavkovic, 1997, The Fragmentation o f Yugoslavia, Nationalism in a Multinational 
State, Macmillan Press LTD, pp. 44-45: Zoran Pajic, 1994, The Former Yugoslavia. In " Minotity 
Rights in Europe: The Scope for a Transitional Regime" ( ed. By Hugh Miall). Royal Institute o f
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The best case in explaining this process is former Yugoslavia. 10 This difference of 
the perceived nationalism in the East and the West proved that the nation-states of 
Central and Eastern Europe were not model democracies, but unstable and ill 
governed.11 This kind of nationalism, based on the past and the myths created, sped 
up the destruction of Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War.
The necessity for taking concrete steps toward a new state of Yugoslavia were 
taken after the assassination of Archduke Fransis Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip 
during his visit to Sarajevo. This minor provocation seemed to be only a pretext, 
for which the Big Powers had been preparing for long, for starting World War I.12 
After the defeat of Germany and Austro-Hungary empire, Serbia with its allies 
were on the winning part .This was the immediate cause for the creation of the first 
Kingdom of Serbo-Croats-Slovenes. The effect of this new state marked the 
beginning of the de facto restoration of the Serbian Medieval Empire 13 Serbia with 
its allies was successful in throwing the Ottoman Empire almost completely out of 
the Balkans, and during the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, Serbia again won the war 
against Bulgaria and expanded its territory to the east including all of present day 
Macedonia and Kosova. 14The Serbs, being on the side of the Allies, considered
International Affairs, pp.56-66 ; Patrie Cabanel, 1996. Nation, Nationalities et Nationalisms en 
Europe: 1850-1920, Editions Ophrys p.213
Ul Zoltán D. Barany, The Roots o f Nationalism in Post Communist Eastern Europe. Balkan Forum. 
vol.2 nr.2 March 1994 pp. 117-118
11 Joseph Rotschild, 1974, East Central Europe between Two World Wars, History o f East Central 
Europe, vol.9 Seattle: University of Washington Press ch.VYugoslavia
12 Vladimir Dedier, 1974, History of Yugoslavia, Me Grow-Hill, INC. p. 467
13 Jovan Cvijic, "Studies in Yugoslav Psychology ", Slavonic Review, vol.9/ 1980-8l,pp.668 ; 
James Gow, 1992, Legitimacy and the Military - The Yugoslav Crisis. St.Martin's Press New York
.5
Stavro Skendi, 1967, The Albanian National Awakening 1878 -1912, Princeton University Press 
Princeton, New Jersey pp. 36-39
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themselves as " Piedmont" or the "natural center" toward which all the others must 
gravitate in the (by them created) new Kingdom. 15
The Croats, after defeating the Austro-Hungarian empire, rushed to create a new 
state. Putting aside the problem of Greater Serbia, to which the Serbs aspired, the 
Croats joined the Serbs in the liberation of the remaining territories. The Croats 
were well aware that they could lose their identity if they lived with Hungarians 
and Germans. The Realpolitik of the time was such that the best solution for the 
Croats and the Slovenes seemed to be in favor of uniting in a Yugoslav state. This 
was due to their internal social unrest, lack of a reliable army, and a very hostile 
international environment.16 17 On the other hand, after the defeat of Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, Italy's ambitions were directed towards a "Venetian Heritage". 
17 This new situation would have either made Serbia a colony of Austria or, at the 
expense of Austria, would have rendered Serbia as the biggest power in the 
Balkans. The new Serb state indeed became only a cover name for the "Greater 
Serbia".18
The Yugoslav Committee, set up by Croatian émigrés, was an organ that 
proceeded the establishment of the new state. It was led by the spiritual leader 
Franjo Stupilo. He was afraid that Prime Minister Nikola Pasic of Serbia might 
bargain with the Big Powers to disfavor of the Croats and Slovenes.19 Pasic, a very 
crafty politician, directed all his diplomatic efforts to prevent recognition of a
15 David MacKenzie, 1994, “ Serbia as Piedmont and the Yugoslav Idea 1804-1914”, East 
European Quarterly 28,2, pp. 153-82; David Mackenzie,1996, Violent Solutions (Revolutions, 
Nationalism, and Secret Societies in Europe to 1918,University Press of America
16 Dusko Sekulic, The Creation and Dissolution of the Multinational State: The case of Yugoslavia, 
Nations and Nationalism vol.3 no.2 1997 July
17 Mark Almond, 1994, Europe's Backyard War, Great Britain, Clays Ltd,stives PLC, pp.116
18 Setton Watson, 1977, Nation and States, Methuen, London, pp.235
19 Dedijer, op.cit. pp.235
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separate state of South Slavs emerging from Austro-Hungary.20 Although different 
in their aims and interests, the Serb and Croat parties cooperated and voted for the 
Corfu Declaration in July 1917, based on the compromise between the position of 
the Yugoslav Committee and that of Serbia led by Pasic. Croats and the Serbs 
agreed that the new Slavic State agreed on a “ Parliamentary monarchy headed by 
the Serb Karadjordjevic dynasty". 2l 2The unity achieved in 1918 ran counter to the 
interests of the parties so that the compromise made there was relatively short. The 
practical political interests from the inception contained a seed of troubles that 
created a nucleus of the fragile basis for the new coming state.
After the fall of the two empires, that of the Ottomans and of Austro-Hungarian, 
the international environment had changed, and the balance of power shifted. Great 
Powers saw the creation of new states as a reflection of the security system set up 
in the Versailles Conference, that is, to prevent the German penetration to the 
East. They welcomed the new state of the South Slavs, instead of having too many 
of the states. The new state of Yugoslavia was regard all the time as a " buffer 
zone" between Central Europe and the Middle East. ( Drang-Nach-Osten). The 
combination of this factor with the internal one led to the creation of Yugoslavia in 
1918. Taken separately, these two factors would not have led to its creation. The 
question whether Yugoslavia was an artificial creature, a long time debate among 
scholars, leads us to give a negative answer to it. Since it was based on interest 
of the parties, but of different nature, and the international community favored the
20 Mihailo Cmobmja, 1994, The Yugoslav Drama, Me Gill Queen's University, pp.46
21 Ivo J. Lederer, 1963, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference: A Study in Frontiermaking, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, pp.26; Ivan Muzic,1969, Hrvatska Politika i Jugoslavenska Ideja, ( 
The Policy o f Croatia and the Yugoslav ldea \ Split: M Franjo Kluz", pp. 105-131; J.F.Brown, 1992, 
Nationalism, Democracy and Security in the Balkans, Rand, pp. 150-151
22 Sekulic, op.cit. ppl65-179; Zoran Pajic,1994 “The Former Yugoslavia”, In Minority Rights in 
Europe, op.cit ,pp. 56-66
common Slav state, one cannot say that it was an artificial creature'23. Even the 
United States President Woodrow Wilson himself thought that it was the best 
solution for the South Slavs. This state of affairs made it easy for the Serbs to 
continue with their domination over Yugoslavia’s state structures (army and the 
police) with the aim of achieving for goals of the Greater Serbia.
1.2. Political Economic And Social Hardships Of Yugoslavia
In order to explain the problems facing old kingdom of Yugoslavia, there needs to 
be made a distinction between those problems. Among them those based on 
ethnicity prevailed. Besides its mixed ethnic structure, other problems of economic 
and social nature had a strong impact on the Kingdom’s overall development in the 
period between two World Wars. In retrospect, cultural differences that emerged 
from various religions of constituent nations of the Kingdom proved to be an 
effective marker of national or ethnic identity which, in turn, created distinctive 
customs, rituals and beliefs that shaped the everyday life of the citizens. This social 
variety would later be one of the incentives to encourage and revive the Serbian 
and Croat nationalism, particularly after the eighties.24
Since its creation in 1918, the Kingdom faced troubles as to the way the state 
should be ran. Croats and Slovenes perceived the Kingdom as a federation between 
three constituent nations (the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes). Thus, the Croatian 
Peasant Party found in 1904 and based on the idea of encompassing all South Slavs 
within one state centered in Zagreb (Croatia), drafted a program in 1919 asking for 
the right to self-determination. The new program had been submitted to the Paris
23 See for more on this issue, Ivo Ledrer, 1963, Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference: A study in
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Peace Conference held after the First World War. The program stressed that the “ 
Croats are separate nation and have national individuality within the 
ethnographical community of the South Slavs” .24 5 The Croat ideas, represented 
mainly by the Croat Peasant Party, ran counter to the Serbian ideology. The latter 
was staunchly centered around the centralized government in Belgrade. Main 
supporter at the time had been Serbia's Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic. He saw the 
new Kingdom as a mere extension of the pre-war Kingdom of Serbia. 26 That 
implied that the Kingdom would be led by the Serbian dynasty from the House of 
Karadjordje. Against this background there eventually emerged a new Yugoslav 
constitution, adopted on 28 July 1921. The constitution established a centralized 
state that in essence denied the existence of various nationalities in Yugoslavia 11 *
The Serbs controlled all political and military structures of the state while Croats 
and the Slovenes had little share. The Constitution simply served to sanction the 
authority of Karadjordje dynasty. His personal dictatorship primarily relied on the 
army, which was utterly under his control and fitted within his dreams of ‘’Greater 
Serbia” . Unlike Croats, the Slovenes did not play an important role in running 
the Kingdom. The reason was that Slovene’s relationship to the Serb dynasty had 
been less conflicting than that of Croats. 29Their insistence on the equality with the 
Serbs was not merely conflicting but also violent as well. The Croats pursued 
hidden and violent ways to challenge the Serbian hegemony. The Ustasa 
Movement was formed in 1929 and operated from the basis in Italy. It committed
Frontiermaking, Yale University, pp.3-80, especially pp. 3,24,26,35,45 and 57
24 Aleksandar Pavkovic,, 1997 , The Fragmentation o f Yugoslavia, pp.44
25 Ivo Banac, 1984, The National Question in Yugoslavia, pp.240
26 Mark Almond, 1994, Europe's Backyard War, pp 117
27 Fredo Culinovic, 1956, Drzavno Pravna historija Jugoslavenskih Zemalja XIX-XX vijeka, vol.2, 
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Philip J.Cohen, 1996, Serbia's Secret War, Propaganda and the Deceit o f History, C,by Philip J. 
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terrorist acts in the name of Croatian independence. One of the victims of that 
movement was King Karadjordje himself. He was assassinated on October 9,1934. 
In fact, the Croatian movement was a direct response to the Belgrade repressive 
policies.
First terrorist acts against the Kingdom occurred, in fact, not in Marseilles but in 
Belgrade. Stjepan Radic, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, was murdered in 
the parliament in 1929, an act followed by the suspension of the constitution and 
the proclamation of a royal dictatorship on January 6,1929. This new situation 
paved the way for the Croatian Peasant Party to pursue and, to a certain extent, 
achieve its political objectives. It did so, first by denouncing Serbian hegemony 
and, second, condemning multinational federalism. That culminated in an 
agreement between the Serbs and Croats establishing in 1939 an autonomous 
territory with Zagreb as its capital, known as “Hrvcitska Banovina ”29 30
Another big and troublesome issue for the Kingdom was its non-recognition of 
other ethnic groups. It had within its borders of 1918 about two million minority 
citizens such as Albanians, the largest minority, even larger than one of the 
constituent nations of the new Kingdom ( the Slovenes), Macedonians, as well as 
half a million Hungarians concentrated in the province of Vojvodina 31 The 
repressive policies against minorities provoked the creation of strong secessionist 
movements among them. In some cases, they allied with other movements of the 
Kingdom’s constituent nations, such as the Macedonian IMVRO ( International
29 Carole Rogel,1977, The Slovenes and Yugoslavism 1890-1914, Boulder,Colo. : East European 
Quarterly, pp.5-10
30 Banac, op.cit, pp 87-8
31 Jozo Tomasevich, (and others), 1969, Contemporary Yugoslavia, Twenty Years o f Social 
Experiment,(s&. by Wayne S. Vucinich), University o f California Press Berkley and Los Angelos
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Macedonian Revolutionary Organization ) and the Croatian Ustasa Movement . 
The position of the Albanians and that of the Muslims was the worst one. They 
were not allowed to practice their education in their mother tongue and they were 
forced to leave their ethnic territories en masse.* 33
This ethnic heterogeneity of the Kingdom, with Serbian hegemony at its peak, 
needed a different political approach as opposed to those already in practice. 
Politically, the Kingdom failed to create a viable parliamentary monarchy of 
recognized Serb-Croat-Slovene nations and unrecognized ethnic groups of 
Albanians, Macedonians, and Muslims 34
Economic side of the story in the new Kingdom was not any better compared to its 
ethnic part. The divisions existed between North and South of the state. This 
division in economic development was a result of diverse historical background. 
Slovenia and Croatia, as a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, were 
suddenly thrown out of the European framework and put into a backward one ,35 
On the other side, Serbia and the rest of the South East inherited a very poor 
economic base. Inability of the Kingdom to bring about a new balance between the 
richest and the poorest areas remained an obstacle for the development of the 
economy. It remained predominantly agrarian state exporting food products and 
raw materials.36 This does not mean that the country was poor in its resources. 
Internationally, Yugoslavia remained a ‘’normal ° country of the capitalist
3,2 Vucinich, ibid, pp..5
33 Hakif Bajrami, Pirraku, Kulturno Prosvetni Pokret.p.36 ; Hugh Poulton.1993. The Balkans, 
Minorities and States in Conflict, ( Minority Rights Group 1991), pp.57-75 ; Hannes Treter - Joseph 
Marko- Tomislav Boric, Perspektivat e Statusit te Arrdshem te Kosoves.( The Perspectives of the 
Future Status of Kosova) " Thema" 14, Prishtine 1966 pp.217-218
34 Vojislav Stanovcic, History and Status of Ethnic Conflicts. In " Yugoslavia a Fractured 
Federalism", 1988 (ed.by Dennison Rusinow), The Wilson Center Press;Washington DC
35 Feron Bemard,Yugoslavie: Origines d'un Conflict. Paris; Le Monde 1993
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periphery in which market economy reigned for the mere reason that it was rich in 
mineral resources so that they were exploited by French, British, German and other 
international companies.36 7
Being only the capitalist periphery, corruption was one of the features that 
characterized the Kingdom. This was yet another dissatisfaction that emerged 
within the new state. These issues, though, will not form part of this work.
1.3. The End Of Kingdom
The Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, renamed as Yugoslavia in 1929, was a failed 
state from the inception. The reasons for this failure should be found in the ethnic 
tensions among its constituent nations and minorities.
Deeply dissatisfied with the regime and hegemony policy of Serbia, nationalist 
movements started organizing themselves. In addition to that of Croat’s, nationalist 
movements among the Albanians and Macedonians emerged. During 1919 there 
was set up the Yugoslav Communist Movement ( the CPY) through consolidating 
various South Slavic Social-Democratic Parties. It proved very successful for it 
was joined by various Yugoslav nationalities. For the success, an important role 
was played not only by the dissatisfaction with the Kingdom's policy but also due 
to the new space created after the successes of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. 
From its creation and especially during the years 1922-1924, the CPY cooperated 
with the nationalist movement in Croatia and backed Macedonians in organizing
36 Ferdo Culinovic,1961, Jugoslavia Izmedju Dva Rata,( Yugosla\>ia Between Two World Wars) (2 
vols.), Zagreb pp.40-51
37 Jozo Tomasevich, 1955, Foreign Economic Relations, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
pp. 188-193 ; Petranovic 1988 , Istorija Jugoslavie, ( The History o f Yugoslavia),Beograd , Nolit, 
pp.56
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the nationalist IMRO, with the program of self-determination for Macedonians and 
the creation of the Macedonian state. The CPY stood for the Macedonian state as 
“being free and independent and an equal member in a future Balkan Federation”. 
38 This policy of the Communists helped the Macedonians to later in 1945 gain 
the status of a nation.
Albanians as the most oppressed group continued their uprisings. Each rebellion 
during 1918-1919, was suppressed by the Serbian army. The reason was that the 
areas of the present day Kosova/o, South Serbia and Macedonia, for many 
enthusiastic Serb nationalists were the territories where they had embarked on the 
final liberation of their lands from foreign rule as far back as 1912. 38 9 At the same 
time these territories were seen as channels for further expansion since the real aim 
was deep penetration into the territory of post-1913 Albania, in order to get access 
to the sea, as outlined by many of their national programs.40
Under pressure, though, the Albanians still continued their activities. In 1924 the 
“Great Medrese” of the King Alexander became a center of both nationalist and 
communist activity. Other illegal organizations as well operated within legally 
recognized youth clubs and sport organizations helping to disseminate the books 
smuggled from Albania. The most prominent ones were “Agimi” (Dawn) and “ 
Drita” ( Light).
Despite the Albanian dissatisfaction with their status in the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom, the government of Albania was not in a position of aiding them. Albania 
was preoccupied with its own struggle for international recognition which
38 Vuchinich, op.cit.3-58
39 Stavro Skendi,1967, The Albanian National Awakening 1878-1912
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Yugoslavia continued to undermine well until the Conference of Ambassadors held 
in Paris The Conference confined and internationally recognized Albania's 
frontiers.40 1 42 In the meantime, prominent Albanian guerilla leader Azem Bejta 
founded the Komiteti i Mbrojtjes Kombetcire Te Kosoves (“Committee for the 
National Defense of Kosova”), with the principal aim of “encouraging an anti- 
Serb insurgency”. Azem Bejta became a famous rebel leader (called kacak) by 
keeping his native Drenica region, the central district Kosova, in permanent revolt 
during the early 1920 . The same region once again in 1998 would be the place 
that triggered the insurgency against Milosevic regime, as we shall see in Ch.IV.
Another factor that ignited the revolt among the Albanians against the regime was 
the colonization of the Albanian inhabited territories. The policy was accompanied 
with brutality and police repression as well as other methods of expulsions of the 
Albanians. These methods of dealing with the Albanians were foreseen in the Serb 
national programs and they had to be fulfilled if there were to exist the ethnically 
pure Serbia. 43
Since the rights of Albanians and Macedonians were denied completely they were 
the most organized for their cause and for this reason they had to cooperate with 
each other. In November 1920 they signed a mutual agreement known as 
Protegorov -  Pristina, named after the names of the two leaders.. The agreement
40 Pirraku, " Kulturno Pros\'etni Pokret"
41 J.Swire, 1971 Albania-The Rise o f a Kingdom, Amo Press & The New York Times, New York
42 Nebil Duraku," Grob 73 .Metra Ispod Zemlje"(73 Metres Under the Earth), VVS, June 6, 
1971,p.35
43 A famous program of Vasa Cubrilovic(1937) was not implemented as a result o f the events 
following the Second World War. John R. Lampe, 1996, Yugoslavia as History, Twice There was a 
Country, Cambridge University Press, pp.188 ; Rexhep.Qosja, The Albanian National Question in 
the Serb Political Programs 1937-1944. M The International Journal o f Albanian Studies” vol.1 no.l 
Fall l997.New York N.Y. Also available in internet, http://www. Albanian.com (IJAS)
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committed the Albanians to the “liberation of Macedonia in its ethnographic and 
geographical frontiers” 44 456
All these activities were organized as a result of the revolt against the supreme 
hegemony of the Serbs under the Kingdom. The Croats that agreed for the “Croc?/ 
Batiovina", were not still satisfied. The agreement, known as “Sporazum" 
(Agreement) fulfilled their desire of being a privileged nation, but still it did not 
solve the national, agrarian or the social question of the Croats whose position 
remained even worse than in Austro-Hungarian times.43 This was the reason that 
Croats, cooperated as well with the other groups, to bring over the hegemony of 
the Serbs.
All these differences exacerbated the Yugoslav state and its viability. On one side 
there were the Serbs with their aspiring policy of “State power”, without taking 
into account all differences that existed, while on the other all the non-Serbs and 
their national denial. These facts had a destructive impact on the Kingdom, that 
yielded only hatred and revenge. That speeded up the end of the Kingdom that had 
also been conditioned by the overall situation on the international scene. 
Following the signature of the German-Soviet Pact, Germany had a free hand in 
Western and Southern Europe. With the invasion of Poland, Yugoslav government 
signed the Tripartite Pact that led to a popular revolt. The government fell, and ten 
days later the German airforce began bombing Belgrade46. The Bulgarian and
44 Catherine Samaiy,1995, Yugoslavia Dismembered, translated by Peter Drucker, Monthly Review 
Press pp.326
45 Christopher Cviic, Croatia In Yugoslavia and After. A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and 
Rebirth. 1996, (ed. by D. A. Dyker and I.Vejvoda), Longman, London and New Y ork, pp.202
46 Ferdo Culinovic,1961, Yugoslavia Izmedju dva rata. (Yugoslavia Between Two Worlds War) 
(vol.II).p.l83
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Italian troops began advancing into the country. The state of Yugoslavia was 
temporarily at an end, but it definitely marked the end of the Kingdom.
Concerning the issue of why first Yugoslavia failed, the reason usually is found in 
that it did not have an obvious Bismarck or Cavour, Ataturk or Tito who would 
have imposed himself upon the “ new state”. Yet, the Kingdom’s failure has deeper 
roots than it may be seen at first sight and the tragedy of Yugoslavia after the end 
of the Cold War proved this undoubtedly.
1. 4 War For National Liberation Or A Civil War ?!
Hatreds among different national groups in the last period of the Kingdom elevated 
to its highest level. The government went on exile and left the country in a 
disastrous situation. The war in Yugoslavia started in 6 April 1941, with the 
bombardment of Belgrade, and by that decision of Axis Powers Yugoslavia was 
broken into pieces. Italy annexed Southern Slovenia and parts of Dalmatia and 
administered Montenegro. Albania was united with Kosovo and Western parts of 
Macedonia, under Italian occupation. Germany annexed northern Slovenia, 
Hungary took part of the Vojvodina, and to Bulgaria was given the rest of 
Macedonia and parts of Southern Serbia.47 .It .was unimaginable, but in a way at 
least all the groups of the first Yugoslavia found themselves in those positions that 
they deemed for, all the time since the creation of the Yugoslav state.
After the invasion, the occupiers needed cooperation. Their first step was to find 
the quisling leaders. In Croatia they looked on cooperation with Macek, since he 47
47 Harold Lydall, 1984, Yugoslav Socialism, Theory& Practice, Oxford University Press, New 
York, pp.55
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refused, the only alternative left for them was Pavelich and his Ustasa movement 
with all that unpopularity it had during first Yugoslavia. They came to power and 
established the independent state of Croatia. This “Puppet State” would encompass 
also Bosnia- Herzegovina, which existed always as a problem between Serbs and 
Croats. When they came to power, Macek broadcasted a statement to the peoples 
on obeying the new authorities, but the truth was that he could not anticipate what 
Ustasa regime was about to do. 48 Soon after they came to power, the Serbs were 
regarded as elements of political aggression against their Croatian State. Their plan 
was to kill a third, to expel a third to Serbia, and to convert the reminder to 
Catholicism. By these traumas and massacres the most affected was the poor 
peasantry of Bosnia.
In reaction to these acts in the Serb inhabited regions resistance groups among the 
Serbs named as Cetniks sprang up in district around Knin and Krajina and in the 
region of Bihac to its East. Cetniks were led by the same ideology of the Ustasa 
regime in Zagreb, which was designed in late 1942 when they held a Chetnik 
Congress and envisaged a Chetnik military dictatorship after the war, based on the 
total political dominance of the Serbs in a unitary Yugoslavia and the expulsion of 
all minorities.49
Although the ethnic rivalry was more expressed between the Croats and the Serbs 
or better to be said , between Ustasas and Chetniks, interethnic conflicts showed 489
48 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, 1988, The Improbable Survivor, Yugoslavia and Its Problems 1918-1988, 
Ohio State University Press, pp. 10-15
49 L. Kuchmar, 1987 Draza Mihailovic and the Rise o f the Chetnik Movement 1941-2, Vol.2, 
London: Garland Publishing, pp.272-5; See for more in the book o f Jozo Tomasevich,1975, The 
Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945-, Stanford University Press. Stanford; 
Duncan Wilson. 1979, Tito's Yugosla\>ia, Cambridge University Press, pp.20-24
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that all groups with the exception of the Slovenes fought against the Serbs, and 
’’extreme nationalists on all sides, were able to indulge their wildest fantasies”. i0
These national ideologies were to re-emerge once again in the late 
1980’s.Reappearing along with the old national myths and ideologies, they called 
not for the reconciliation but for the final settling of old scores.50 1 52The framework of 
these ideologies was provided with the fantasy and the prominence of their culture 
while the other nations living in the area were viewed with skepticism and were 
seen as a permanent threat to the survival of their own nation or culture. This 
established a ground and opened a scene yet for another hatred among them.
Since Bosnia was the place that suffered most extensively of ethnic revenge, from 
1941 in a town east of Bosnia, the first proletarian brigade was formed, 
commanded by a Spanish civil war veteran Koca Popovic, a Serb communist, 
known as a fervent communist. Although very small, this unit was a nascent of the 
future Partisan and mobile army, and it was able to recruit masses fed-up with 
massacres of Chetniks and Ustasas. The brigades were led by Tito who 
distinguished himself by his service in the Habsburg Army after 1914.32 His aim 
was to promote a common struggle against the invaders and to lay a basis for the 
revolution based on the Soviet model.
50 Christopher Benett, 1995, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, Causes, Course and Consequences, 
Hurst & Company, London, cit. pp.47
51 James Gow, 1997,The Triumph o f the Lack o f Will, International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav 
War, Hurst & Company:London pp.12; Almond, op.cit,ppl33-150; Jahja Sadowski, “Ethnic 
Conflict”, Foreign Policy, no.Ill,Sum m er1998, ppl2-23; Mattei Dogan, “Nationalism in Europe: 
Decline in the West, Revival in the East”, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, vol.3 no.3 ,Autumnl997,
52 Branislav Iliq, Vojislav Qirkoviq,1979, Kronolog/ia e Veprimtarise Revolucionare te Josip Broz 
Titosf The Chronology o f the Revolutionary Acts o f Josip Broz Tito) Beograd, pp 2-10; Stevan K. 
Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator, A Reassessment, Ohio State University Press, 
Columbus 1992, pp51
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Albanians of Kosovo did not joined the communists in the beginning. Having 
united with Albania under Italian occupation, Albanians viewed the communist 
movement skeptically. Starting from 1943, they joined the brigades, and this was 
only after the promise from Yugoslav Communists who had previously advocated 
precisely the same arrangement and the position that the Albanians had under 
Italian occupation.53
Concerning the issue of whether this was a civil war or war for liberation, it is still 
debatable. Some authors claim that it was combined, embracing the two elements. 
Some still write with emotions as the “Liberation War”, as Djilas interpreted as 
the “ Partisan Heroism” 54 Nevertheless, the truth is that “ Yugoslavs were 
slaughtered by other Yugoslavs more than by foreign soldiers. 55The reason is that, 
compared to other battlefronts, the fighting in Yugoslavia was small-scale, and 
territory of Yugoslavia was used as the place for resting the soldiers. The only time 
when the significant number of German troops was in Yugoslavia were during the 
initial invasion in 1941 and 1944. Germany relied in quisling forces to keep 
Yugoslavia under control, living German troops free for more important 
battlefronts, especially those in the Soviet Union.56
At the end we are ready to pose a question of, why the unity is favored once again 
after all that slaughtering? This issue will be discussed thoroughly in the following 
parts of this work
53 Branka Magas, 1993, The Destruction o f Yugoslavia, Tracing the Break - Up ¡980-92, Verso, p. 7- 
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54 Aleksa Gjillas, 1991, The Contested Country, Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919- 
1953, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusets: London pp. 147.
55 Pavlowitch, 1988,The Improbable Survivor,op.cit pp. 15
56 ibid, pp. 10-15
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CHAPTER II :THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA AND THE
DEVELOPMENETS UP TO THE BEGINNING OF ITS DISSOLUTION
2.1. Tito's Ideas on Federalism
As noted earlier, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom was a state that, despite its 
ethnic diversity, exercised intolerance and hegemony. The Kingdom was mainly 
Serb dominated and that inevitably would lead to the civil war in 1941. Its bloody 
collapse marked inter ethnic killing, satisfaction of peasant radicalism that resulted 
in a large scale atrocities of at least 2.2 million out of 18 million citizens .* It 
showed that it was not vital state either for such a state would not end in a bloody 
civil war. These facts had to be taken into account by the Communists while 
contemplating whatever state form for the future state of Yugoslavia. The national 
question remained the most important issue facing the new Communist leadership 
of Yugoslavia. A big gap in economy, besides the national question, was the 
second of two issues that tested the vitality and the strength of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia (CPY). Taking into account the fact that the previous order 
was discredited and the Communists were the most dynamic element, Tito and his 
comrades remained the only viable force in Yugoslavia's post-War process of 
recreation 2 1
1 Paul Mojzes, 1994, Yugoslavian Inferno, Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans, Continum, New 
York, pp.47; B. Kocavic, 1985, Zrtve Drugog Svjetskog Rata u Jugoslaviji.f The Victims of The 
Second World War), London, Nase Delo, pp.126 ; John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict, Adelphi 
Paper 270, International Institute of Strategic Studies , London, Brassey's 1992
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They proclaimed and forged the new ideology , rightly named by Djilas (the 
Yugoslav dissident) , as a "progressive ideological make up " by trading national 
loyalties. That would made possible the recruitment of all nations to the 
Communist cause, including the non-Slavs (Albanians and Hungarians in the first 
place). 2 3 Besides this recruitment policy, it was only after 1943 that the partisans 
took the control over the large portions of Yugoslav territory. Of course, the 
decisive role was played, as elswhere in Eastern Europe, by the Red Army .4 5
No doubt, Tito was the crucial figure in the very genesis of Yugoslavia's recreation 
including its future development up to the dissolution in 1992. Its first brigade was 
set up in 1943 in the Bihac area of Bosnia-Herzegovina . Not accidentally, Bosnia - 
Herzegovina was chosen as a place where the second Yugoslavia emerged from 
the ashes for there occurred the most ferocious inter ethnic - atrocities From the 
outset, Tito proclaimed the national equality among Yugoslavs. Based on this, on 
November 1943, it was held the so-called "AVNOJ" meeting in which the federal 
principle of Communist Yugoslavia was declared and the territorial integrity 
affirmed. These decisions, later endorsed by the 1945 "AVNOJ" meeting, were 
considered as the best solution of the Yugoslav national question. The Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia was legally suspended on that occasion. 6
Besides its occupation and dismemberment during the WW II, Tito managed to 
preserve Yugoslavia’s international subjectivity. Thus, although he changed its
2 Michael Lees, 1990, The Rape of Serbia, The British Role in Tito's Grab For Power 1943-1944, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, pp.4-6
3 Djilas, Contested Country, cit, pp. 152
4 Stevan K. Pavloeitch, The Improbable Survivor, op.cjt. 13; Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia, 
op.cit. pp.4
5 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator, op.citp.35
6 Branko Petranovic & Cedomir Strbac, 1997, Istorija Socialisticke Yugoslavief The History of 
Socialist Yugoslavia. First Book, Radnicka Stamapa, Beograd, pp.23)
Prva Knjiga, Radnicka Stampa, Beograd,
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political system he reached an agreement with the representatives of the exiled 
King of Yugoslavia, later to be known as "Tito-Subasic Agreement". In the 
agreement it was stated that Yugoslavia remains the same international person 
while its dual political system would be settled later through negotiations and 
agreement between the parties.7
New federal state of Yugoslavia aiming at different approach to the national 
question was created only when the republics of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro 
were recognized. In the latter case there were oppositions to its formation for it was 
considered as a natural extension of Serbia. Yet, the CPY availed itself of the 
opportunity to set up the tiny republic of Montenegro. The same right was 
recognized to Macedonia which was established in what had been "South Serbia" 
and with its own Slav language more similar to Bulgarian evaluated to the status of 
an official language.8 The republican status was not granted to the Bosniacs until 
1968. It never became a reality for the Albanians.
Albanians were convinced that the spirit of the Yugoslav Communists was totally 
opposed to that of former Royal Government.9 It was agreed that the Albanians 
should be able to chose their destiny with the right to self-determination. For this 
reason the Kosovar Albanians had fought the Nazis and the Fascists hoping that 
Kosovo would become one with motherland Albania. Tito considered the Albanian 
issue as a very sensitive one and believed that it should be solved within his
7 ibid, pp.27
8 Mirko Tepavac, "Tito's Yugoslavia". In Yugoslavia’s Ethnic Nightmare, 1995, (ed. by) Jasminka 
Udovicki & James Ridgeway, Lawrence Hill Books, pp.59 ; James Gow, 1992, Legitimacy and the 
Military, The Yugoslav Crisis, St. Martin’s Press New York, pp.9
9 Safete Juka,1984, Kosova the Albanians in Yugoslavia in Light of Historical Documents, Waldon 
Press Inc. pp.136; Hannes Treter- Joseph Marko- Tomislav Boric, "Perspektivat e Statusit te 
arrdhshem te Kosoves”.( Perspectives of the Future Status of Kosova) op.cit. pp. 217-218; Baranka 
Magas, 1993,The Destruction of Yugoslavia, Verso, pp.34
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projects of the Balkan Federation. The Federation foresaw an alliance between 
Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, a process nipped in the bud by Stalin.10
Tito, as a pragmatic as he was, had fears of the Serbian nationalism. His first 
experience was Royal Yugoslavia. In his path to retain firm grip on power, besides 
republics, he set up two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, both 
within the Republic of Serbia. It was not meant to solving the national question 
but, as argued by Cernobmja, to serve as the most convenient vehicle to cut the 
Serbian size. This does not mean that Tito was anti-Serbian but rather a pro 
Yugoslav leader.11 For Tito it was very important to build a power base in largely 
hostile Serbia that saw in Tito with skepticism due to his ethnic origin, half-Croat, 
half Slovene and had not only dethroned the Serbian Karadjordjevic dynasty in 
1945 but had also Draza Mihajlovic tried and shot as a Nazi collaborator in 1946.
To oppose the Serbs, Tito espoused Yugoslav "unitarism", which both directly and 
indirectly favored the revival of Serb influence, especially in the Army, the police, 
the diplomatic service and the federal government in Belgrade, the capital of 
Serbia as well as of Yugoslavia. Federated though in its structure, the state 
remained centralist and was anything more unitary and centralist than it had been 
under King Alexander.12 This form of federalism which Tito created in 1945 at 
first suited the Serbs because in essence the state remained centralist in this way 
and dominated both Kosovo and Vojvodina, wielded considerable power in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia as well as. in Serbia and Montenegro. This
10 Noel Malkom, 1998, Kosovo A Short History, Macmillan, pp.319-320; Elisabeth Barker, 1980, 
Macedonia Its Place in Balkan Power Politics, Greenwood Press Publishers, pp.129
11 Paul Shoup, "Titoism and the National Question in Yugoslavia: A Critical Reassessment". In The 
Desintegration o f Yugoslavia, 1992,(ed. by) Martin van Den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama, Yearbook 
of European Studies, Amsterdam- Atlanta, GA
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arrangement actually strengthened the Serb hold over the country.12 3
Such an extended hand of the Serbs over the country was made possible through 
Alexander Rankovic, chief of the secret police, founded and promoted by Tito 
himself in 1943. Rankovic created a network of informers in all places and a vast 
archives of dossiers not only of suspected and enemies but also of loyal Party 
leaders. His fall from power in July of 1966, generally was viewed at the time as a 
defeat of Serbian bid to control the CPY and, though it, the whole country. 14 The 
event itself paved the way for the 1974 decentralization of the country that 
brought in the type of federation more liberal that would not allow Serbia any 
more too much space for maneuver as in the past. This was the reason why the 
1974 Constitution was criticized so much in Serbia after Tito’s death in 1980.
.HntilJbis death, Tito had been a central political figure in Yugoslavia for he was an 
unquestioned arbiter. He would intervene wherever the system was threatened by 
internal conflicts.15 But, in his efforts to satisfy all, Tito risked to satisfy nobody, 
as proved after his death. Although the Communist Yugoslavia which emerged out 
of the WWII was a genuine attempt to reconcile the interests of all, the system of 
Government was intricate and complex and designed to be manifestly fair.. Hence 
a right conclusion by Catherine Samary who says that "federalism of Tito was not 
an artificial creature because had the CPY not won the legitimacy, the new 
government could not have been in power and survived several decades without
12 Branimir Anzulovic, 1999, Heavenly Serbia, From Myth to Genocide, Hurst & Company, 
London, pp.95
13 Christopher Benett, op.cit. pp.55
14 Paul Shoup , 1968, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, New York; Columbia 
University Press, pp. 115-116; Dennisow Russinow,1997, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974, 
London, C. Hurst,Co. pp.187
15 Mark Almond, op.cit. 159; Paul Shoup op.cit.pp.58
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major explosions, given all the experienced traumas of the war left behind". 16
2.2. Myths On Which Former Yugoslavia Was Based
While the WWI was still going on, the CPY represented the only party among 
Yugoslavs offering a common solution for all of them through propagating an 
entirely new ideology of brotherhood and unity among its various nations. Such an 
ideology would later serve to mobilize popular masses and gather a very much of 
support among Yugoslavia’s nations. That ideology was personified by Marshall 
Tito.
The war had had too many victims among Yugoslavs and ethnic hatred 
exacerbated to unimaginable proportions. The latter came to be the hardest and 
most cumbersome task facing Tito’s ideology. To bridge this ethnic hatred, 
especially between the Serbs and Croats, posed a very serious challenge. As in 
other Communist countries, instead of trying to mitigate real ethnic problems, Tito 
and his comrades embarked on a policy of searching for enemy outside, mainly 
within the various social strata. All ethnic violence was put at the doors of the 
Ustashe regime in Zagreb and at the others puppet regimes’ doors in Belgrade and 
elsewhere in Yugoslavia. They were considered as a product of international 
burgouasie. The struggle and the rebuilding of Communist Yugoslavia were the 
substitutes for the real causes of the ethnic violence and its long-term 
consequences.17
Such an approach was made clear by Tito in his speech in 1994 whereby he had
16 Catherine Samary, Yugoslavia Desintegration, cit.pp.58
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declared that the war was waged for the sake of settling old scores with the 
national burgesses. In the speech, he had paid to much attention to the brotherhood 
and unity among Yugoslav people considering the equality and unity among them 
as a "condictio sine qua non" for his new order and for the transformation of the 
old hegemony of the Serbs into a new spirit of tolerance. Along these lines, the 
brotherhood and unity was used as a key term propagated by the CPY. It was 
meant to stand for the equality and mutual respect among Yugoslav peoples where 
they would fight, work and live together with equal rights and duties, regardless of 
nationality, race or religion. This represented one of ways the CPY tried to bridge 
the ethnic differences and overcome any fear from hegemonic tendencies.17 8 
Although today this might be seen as an object of scorn, it was not an empty 
demagoguery in a country where hundreds and thousands lost their lives due to 
ethnic violence . 19
The equality of Yugoslav nations was considered the important issue after the War. 
For this reason, it was even sanctioned in Art. 21 of the 1946 Constitution of 
Yugoslavia.20 Wartime slogan “brotherhood and unity” symbolized the nations of 
Yugoslavia comprising not only the equality but as well the Yugoslav integration 
and the creation of a common Yugoslav consciousness which was meant to be a 
supranational identity instead of national. 21This was the way foreseen for settling 
the national question. The CPY believed that it would gradually lead to a complete
17 Tito’s speech, published on Proleter, December 1942
18 George Schopflin,” Nationhood, Communism and State Legitimation, Nations and Nationalism 
“, vol.l, parti,March 1995; Petranovic& Strbac, op.cit. pp.26
19 Tepavac, op.cit,pp.59
20 FNRJ Ustav,1946
21 Vesna V. Godina,” The Outbreak of Nationalism on Former Yugoslav Territory: A Historical 
Perspective on the Problem of Supranational Identity”, Nations and Nationalism, vol.4,part3, July 
1988, pp.409-422
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disappearance of national consciousness .22 23
The above path had been modeled upon the Soviet Union which was considered 
as a country that had solved the national question ideally. Russia served as a 
reference point, although in the case of Yugoslavia the Slav unity and solidarity 
weighted equally The Slav cause was meant to transcend individual nationalities. 
This would be an ideal of creating a nation state, composed of Yugoslavs. Yet, the 
Communists faced the same problem the Italians did at the time of Italy’s 
unification. Italian Conte Massimo d ’ Azgelio , considered in his time that : “ We 
have made Italy, now we have to make the Italians instead of Sicilians, Sardinians 
...”.'!3 So, the Yugoslav Communists had to fight for the “Yugoslavs” as well.24
Such manner of nation-building was deemed achievable through the Communist 
policy of recruitment of new cadres from within the all constituent republics more 
or less proportionally, as well as through the recruitment of other “neglected strata” 
of society and other “unrecognized ethnic groups” such as Muslims and 
Albanians.25 In this way, other potential ideological or national approaches were 
neutralized and cleansed from the CPY, thus making the new Communist 
federation more tightened and centralized.26
In practice, the very notion of “Yugoslavism” will remain as a term implying the
22 Speech of the Secretary General KPJ Josip Broz Tito held in establishment of the Kongres KP 
Srbije (8-12 Maj 1945).After the liberation of the country ,Tito promoted Yugoslavism and 
insisted that the borders of republics should not divide but unite the peoples of 
Yugoslavia.
23 The words were spoken at the time of unification of Italy in 1861.
24 Dobrica Cosic, “Uslovi Demokratske Buducnosti”, (Tasks of the Democratic Future), Knjizevne 
Novine, 15 December,pp.78-9,
25 J.F.Brown,op.cit. pp.61-63
26 Paul Shoup, 1968,Communism and the Yugoslav National Question,New York,Columbia 
University Press, pp. 115-16
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state itself but not its constituent nations, that is, the CPY would not achieve the 
cleansing of national identities that would exist in parallel with Yugoslav state.27 
Such an approach towards Yugoslavism had an impact on interethnic relations, 
especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There, interethnic marriages were very common 
phenomena although it was composed of Serbs, Croats and Muslims. Most of 
them, during the time, identified themselves as “Yugoslavs”. In the 1953 census, a 
huge percentage of the population in Yugoslavia would declare themselves as 
“Yugoslavs”.28
Besides the political cadres recruited through the CPY, the Communists had yet 
another duty to cultivating a new spirit of Yugoslavism by organizing voluntarily 
the youths into various working brigades and excursions. The new generations had 
a sense of belonging to a stable European country, largely because of its growing 
national prestige, and a feeling was that the war was a phenomenon of the past and 
will never happen again.This was helped by the new way of building the Socialism 
inaugurated through the self-management system designed to curb the power of 
bureaucracy, and in this regard favoring the autonomy and sovereignty of the 
republics. It was believed that, among others, the working class would create the 
unified Yugoslav consciousness .29
Yugoslavia had an image abroad and with this image outside the people would 
identify themselves in a proud way. But this was in fact Titos’s merit and his
27 J.B.Tito 1940/1946. “ The Previous Works and the Tasks of the Party”. Speech Delivered at the 
Fifth Conference of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,Zagreb,October 1940. Published in 
Communist, no. 1,October 1946; Vesna V.Godina op.cit. pp.409-422
28 Interview, Sarajevo, June 1980, cited in Sabrina Petra Ramet,1992, Nationalism and Federalism 
in Yugoslavia (1962-199l)second edition, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis
29 Nenad D. Popovic, 1968, Yugoslavia the New Class In Crisis, Syracuse University Press pp.61- 
82, see for more, A.Z.Rubenstein,1970,Kugo5/avia and the Nonaligned World , Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, pp.5-15
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charisma that contributed to Yugoslavia’s favorable image abroad and inside the 
country. The main reason for this was Tito’s way pursued after the break up with 
Stalin. Then, he had chosen a Non-Aligned path and inside he had already built a 
new system of building the Socialism. Non-Aligned Movement enabled Tito to 
have a huge financial support from international community, especially from the 
Western countries. This support came as a result of Western fears that Tito may 
turn, due to Stalin’s pressure, towards the Sovien Union again. In this way, Tito 
and his Yugoslavia served at least as a “buffer zone” between East and West .30
All these factor had an impact on Yugoslavia’s Socialism that gave to it a “human 
face” compared to other Socialist countries. Tito managed to keep together the 
country not only ideologically but as well though the Yugoslav Army (JNA) in 
which he invested so much.31 32 After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavs started to live 
more,and .more with distorted intepretations of the past, wedded empty rhetoric of 
Titoism and its twin pillars' of Self-Management and Non-Aligned Movement 
became an obsolete issue. The same case was with the brotherhood and unity 
myths in a society where the Communists were losing their impact over its 
structures day but day. The CPY was gradually becoming powerless to influence 
its own destiny and with it the destiny of the entire country of Yugoslavia ?2 With 
the CPY’s role vanishing, other pillars and myths (Brotherhood and Unity among 
Yugoslavs, Self-Management and the Non-Allied Movement) faded away 
altogether.
30 David Owen, 1995JJalkan Odyssey, Indigo, pp.l 1, Sekulic op.cit.pp.165-179
31 Stoyan Pribichevic, ‘Tito at 80: An Uncomplicated Marxist’,New York Times,25 may 1972; Jim 
Seroka and Radoslav Smiljkovic, 1986political Organs in Socialist Yugoslavia, Duke U.P, 
Durham, pp.55-6,6 0
32 Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia, The Policy o f  “ Ethnic Cleansing” Texas A&M,University 
Press College Station 1995,pp.21
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After the end of the WW II, there were held the elections in Yugoslavia. They 
brought to power the Communists. In the first phase of its development, the CPY 
was guided by the Soviet-type of ideology. It meant that the entire social and 
political system would have to be based on the Marxist ideology and its dogmas.
Although federal in its form, the structure of the Yugoslav state would be from its 
inception a centralist one.33 Political power, was based on the Soviet model, that is, 
it was concentrated in the highly centralized CPY and its highest executive organ 
was Politburo whose members were chosen by the Party’s General Secretary 
Marshal Tito.34
In this way, weak and still surviving elements of the post war civil society were 
destroyed or engulfed by the party state. Party would play central role and come to 
be regarded as the state, and the ideology that ran the state together with the terror 
induced fear and crippled any potentially significant political opposition to the 
regime. There were all the elements working towards “homogenization” and 
strengthening of the “vertical links”. This was made possible as well due to the 
Party’s monopoly that rejected any political pluralism. As with other Communist 
dictatorship, in Yugoslavia too Marxist ideology considered the political parties as 
a “superstructure of the Capitalist social and economic order, whose hidden 
purpose was to perpetuate that order”. The Communist ideology maintained that a 
monopoly of power by a communist party is a prerequisite for the revolutionary
33 Nenad, D, Popovic, op.cit. pp. 61-82
2.3. Political and Constitutional Structure of the Second Yugoslavia
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transformation of society.34 5
In that spirit was adopted the first Constitution of Yugoslavia in January of 194. 
That constitution legitimized the power base of the CPY. It limited the sovereignty 
of the Yugoslav republics by foreseeing that certain right would belong only to the 
Federated Yugoslavia. The 1946 Constitution marked the new beginning in a 
revived Yugoslavia, renamed as the “Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia”. 36 
It was the first one to mark the end of the Serbian hegemony over Yugoslavia after 
twenty years.
Many have argued that the Constitution was a close copy of Stalin’s 1936 
Constitution for it reflected Lenin’s approach to national question in the 1920s and 
the Commitment made by the CPY in 1928 that it would replace the Kingdom’s 
unitary state with a federal order.37
Yet, if we compare the Soviet Constitution of 1936 with that of Yugoslavia’s a 
decade later, a distinction would be very big for the reason that Soviet Constitution 
granted to its nationalities not only the right to secede but also the independent 
armed forces. The issue of self-determination had as well been differently crafted 
as compared to the Soviet Union. Thus, in Art. 1 of the 1946 Constitution of 
Yugoslavia, there was stated that : “ Yugoslavia is a community of equal peoples 
that on the basis of self-determination, including the right of secession, have 
expressed their will to live together in a federal state”. It was considered that the
34 ib id , pp. 61-82
35 Djillas op.cit, pp.152, Zoltán D. Barany, op.cit. pp. 116
36 FNRJ,Ustavl946
37 S.Markovic,1923,Nacionalno Pitanje u Svetlosti Marksizma, (National Question in the Light of 
Marxism), Belgrade,
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right to self-determination has been exercised once and for a ll.
After the break up with the Soviet Union, there started the new manner of 
transformation of the Yugoslav society. It conditioned the changes in Yugoslavia’s 
constitutional structure. In line with this there was adopted a new constitutional 
law in 1953 with the aim of abandoning the Soviet model and creating a new and 
“original constitution”.38 9 Although the intention of this law had been the 
transformation of the society, on the issue of self-determination it remained more 
or less silent compared to the previous constitution. The transformation of the 
CPY into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (The LCY) was meant to 
further decentralize the country. This, together with the introduction of the self­
management system in economy, proved to be the turning points toward the pretty 
much original way of Yugoslav Socialism. That was the initial phase of the 
“Yugoslav experiment” and would be the main feature of Yugoslav Socialism. The 
transformation of this type had an impact , even before the 1963 Constitution was. 
adopted, in a sense that it initialed a new type of political coalition to be forged 
between business leaders as well as liberal-minded people who were willing to see 
through the reshaping of decision making and shift in the locus of power away 
from the Party towards the citizens.40 Anyway, the Communist Party still remained 
the main force in conducting the state affairs and liberal way as provided for will 
remain an unfeasible in practice. That way of liberal ascendancy in Yugoslav 
thinking characterized only the years after 1970.
38 Paul Shoup op.cit.pp.l 18; In a difference from the Yugoslav constitution of 1946, the Soviet 
constitution guaranteed to its nationalities not only the right to secede, but also an independent 
foreign policy and armed forces.
39 Jovan Djordjevic, 1978, Ustavno Pravo, Belgarde,pp.5-20
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This quasi-liberal period stared with the Constitutional Amendments of 1971. They 
paved the way for the 1974 Constitution. Since it was a time of more or less liberal 
thought in Yugoslavia, the centralist tendencies within the Serbian elite were 
identified with Great Serbian aspirations, resulting in the formation of a stable anti- 
Serbian coalition.40 1 It was a time when a part of Yugoslav elite saw a breath of 
liberalism as an opportunity to dismantle the dictatorial superstructure altogether, 
openly advocating installation of a two party system in Yugoslavia but still 
committed to Socialism.
As a result of these liberal forces and the new claims for the change in Yugoslav 
society, there was adopted the 1974 Constitution. The Constitution marked the 
corner stone in Yugoslavia’s confederation. It created the semi confederation until 
its disintegration in 1992 by providing the devolution of power in republics and 
autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. It channeled the various 
conflicting aspirations for more autonomy from the center that would later lead to 
Yugoslavia’s bloody collapse.
Compared with previous constitutions of 1946, 1953 and 1963, the 1974 
Constitution represents a radical change since the previous ones did not foresee 
any unanimous consent of the federal units regarding the cardinal issues of 
Yugoslavia’s political and state system altogether (changing of the Constitution, 
issue of borders, monetary and foreign policy, etc.). 42 Even the autonomous 
provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina had the right to veto the constitutional
40 Vladimir Goati, The Challenge of Post-Communism. In The Tragedy of Yugoslavia , The Failure 
of Democratic Transformation 1992 (ed. by) Jim Seroka and Vukasin Pavlovic, M.E Sharpe,Inc. 
pp.3-13
41 Magas, op.cit, pp.35-39, Bruce McFarlane,1988, Yugoslavia , Politics, Economics and Society, 
Pinter Publishers : London and New York pp.55-65
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changes that would be deemed by them as detrimental to their interests. This does 
not mean that the LCY would not be still the main actor in directing Yugoslavia’s 
affairs. Instead, it retained much the same monopoly in running the daily affairs of 
the State of Yugoslavia, but a liberal spirit ushered in by the 1974 Constitution was 
very much noticeable even to the foreigners,' especially when compared to the 
former Socialist countries of the time.
2.4. The Decentralization As A Substitute For the Political Democratization 
Of The Country
As noted earlier, even before the 1974 Constitution there were voices heard within 
the Yugoslav republics asking for more liberalization. These voices of 
dissatisfaction and vocal grievances came from some of the republics. The 
problems asked for immediate response and solution. In response to the pressures 
the LCY decided to devolve administrative, economic and some political powers in 
accommodation to the diverse reality and mixture of nations and cultures. It was 
done as well to accommodate the new generation that was more liberal and that 
asked for reforms directed against, as they called it, “old type of development 
model”.42 3 This devolution was sanctioned with the 1974 Constitution that brought 
about changes within the legal, economic and political system. The way of 
conducting the State affairs was changed from its previous vertical line into a 
horizontal one whereby the centralism had been replaced with wide 
decentralization of the State structures.
Such a process had been a necessity since further centralization would have meant
42 Vojislav Kostunica, “The Constitution and The Federal States”, In Fractured Federalism 1988,
40
the loss of vital advantage offered both by the self-management model in general 
and by the Yugoslav system, the breaking down and the dispersion of conflicts of 
interests. 44 With this constitution, there were carefully destroyed the very 
foundations of the “Yugoslav political community” since there was no valid way to 
expressing the affiliation to Yugoslavia as the State of citizens.
The 1974 Constitution had been designed to prevent any of Yugoslav peoples from 
dominating the Federation by dispensing with the trappings of a Confederation 
with eight actors of the new balance of power and, second, to prevent any 
individual from acquiring as much power as Tito himself had had by keeping for 
himself the life-time post of the head of the State and the control over the Armed 
Forces. This was made possible through the establishment of the one-year 
Collective Presidency organ that would rule on the rotation principle after the 
death of Tito. The Constitution has been considered as a result of a new spirit that 
emerged at the time. The new Federation was hot, as one Serbian scholar wrote, a 
“matter of accident but an expression of one ideology or one intellectual sympathy, 
It is a product of history, of objective necessity and political wisdom”. 45
Guided by the idea that no process of domination would be allowed, it has been 
provided that all changes to the Constitution require a common consent of the 
federal units while Serbia was forced into a “unique” position within the new 
balance of power. The Constitution foresaw that the autonomous provinces could
(ed.by) Dennison Rusinow, The Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, pp.78-93
43 Vladimir Goati.op.cit. pp3-22; Almond op. cit. Pp. 150-171
44 Ivan Simonovic, “Socialism, Federalism, and Ethnic Identity”. In Yugoslavia a Fractured 
Federalism, 1988,(ed, by Rusinow), op.cit. pp. 41-58; Slavko Radosevic,” The Collapse of 
Yugoslavia -  Between Chance and Necessity”. In Yugoslavia and After, A Study in Fragmentation, 
Despair and Rebirth, 1996,(eds. by) David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, Longman pp.75
45 Jovan Djordjevic, “Deset Parvila Federacije”, (Ten Pillars of the Federation) Naprijed, January 
1978,
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change their constitutions without the interference of the Republic of Serbia.46 This 
was a new manner of conducting the daily state affairs that did not fit at all to the 
Serbs for it stopped the Belgrade’s policy of centralist management of the State 
and the policy of assimilation or denationalization towards the Macedonian and 
Muslim Slavs and certain minorities (notably the Albanians)47 . Now, it became 
apparent that the effective power resting at the level of the republics was so strong 
that the parts were able to dictate the rules to the whole and the federal units could 
block any of the possibility for the central authorities based on the party basis.
Such a federated arrangement made Yugoslavia different from all other Socialist 
federations of the time .48 Since the foreign affairs, defense and essential economic 
matters remained the prerogative of the federal center and needed the consensus 
among the federal units, every republic and the autonomous provinces had equal 
rights and access to the positions of power . Thus, the nation would become the 
political category and centralist power was simply transferred from the federal 
authority to the republics.
At the time, the 1974 Constitution had been considered as perfect solution and as 
the only “modus vivendi” for the problems facing Yugoslav State. It is against this 
background that the Communist leaders nourished hopes and illusions that they 
had solved all political, social and national problems and that they managed to 
create a “heaven of peace” in Europe at a time when ETA, IRA, Red Brigades etc.,
46 Mehmet Kraja,1995, Vitet e Humbura.(The Lost Years) Tirane pp.74; J.F.Brown,op.cit pp.150- 
151; Tim ludah, 1997 The Serbs,History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, Yale University 
Press, pp.159-153
47 Paul Shoup, "Titoism and The National Question in-Yugoslavia: a Reassessmenfet.al Willem 
Wemeer, “Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia”. In The Desintegration of Yugoslavia, 1992,(ed .by) 
Martin van Den Heuvel and Jan G. Siccama
48 Kostunica,op.cit. pp.80
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were in full swing.49 0
But, the Constitution was a legal text characterized by confused principles and 
overlapping rights. Potential conflict has been caused by a mere fact of non­
designating precisely who were the subjects of self-determination in Yugoslavia. If 
looked at closely, its first article said that “Yugoslavia is a federal state having the 
form of a state community, of voluntarily unified nations and their Socialist 
Republics and Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo”. This 
further implied that this right had been exercised once and for all through the 
nation’s identification with one federal state. That resembled very much the 1946 
Constitution.30 It provided that, indirectly, the only states to be formed from 
Yugoslavia would be republics and not its constituent nations irrespective of the 
place where they lived and, what is more important, it did not foresee any legal or 
other mechanism for the resolution of conflicts.51
This hindrance to Yugoslavia’s development had earlier been foreseen by Edward 
Kardelj, one of the closest Tito’s allies. He stated as far back as 1957 that:” 
Yugoslavia is a historically temporary creation. The world is an integration 
process... The peoples will be able to go and join new associations and 
integration... In that sense , the Slovenes will understandably be with Italian and 
Austrians and the Serbs with the Bulgarian or with other historically close 
peoples...” 52
49 Ivan Vejvoda, Yugoslavia 1945-1991, “From Decentralisation without Democracy to 
Dissolution”. In Yugoslavia and After,1996,( ed. by) Dyker, Vejvoda op.cit pp. 14
S0Antonio Cassesse, 1995,Self-Deterrmination of Peoples and the Recent Break-Up, A Legal 
Reappraisal. Cambrige University Press, pp. 140-141
51 ibid pp. 140-142
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With this constitution, Yugoslavia as a state would not function de facto. Each 
republic began to pursue its national development strategy with predictable 
results, often at expense of the rest of the Federation. Within a few years of Tito’s 
death in 1980, each republic and autonomous province had become “ a state within 
a state”. The center no longer held. Gaps between the nations began widening 
uncontrollably. Beneath surface the ground was turbulent.52 3 If we obey Dante’s 
famous saying that the “road to hell is paved with good intentions”, this proved to 
be a key factor in the pattern of degeneration, fragmentation and entering the 
inferno and suffering loss. Tito and other Communist leaders were still functioning 
under the logic of “soft totalitarianism”. They continued to make all the key 
decisions and that is the reason why this period was considered a period of 
“decentralization without liberalization” . The differences and not common values 
emerged gradually and legitimized the new adverse balance of forces as between 
old enemies .54 Anyway while Tito was still alive, he was the supreme leader and 
was the guarantor of the unity of the country. It was not the system that functioned, 
but Tito himself.
If we analyze the 1974 system in Yugoslavia we could notice that the uncertainty 
had been introduced into the lives of citizens by the recurrent changes of rules in 
political, social and economic spheres during that period (1974-1980). There were 
no real democratic mechanisms to accommodate the various needs and settle the 
problems among Yugoslavs. The four successive constitutions within a span of less
52 Dobrica Cosic,” Uslovi Demokratske Buducnosti”, (Conditions For The Future Democracy) 
Knjizevne Novine, 15 December,1987 pp.7-8
53 Tepavac.op. cit. pp.67
54 Lidija R. Basta-Posavec, Federalizam Bez demokradje, Politicka Prava Bez Gradjanina- Poruke 
Raspada Jugoslavije za Evropu. ,( Federalism Without Democracy, Politics of Law Without 
Citizens-Message of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia for the Europe). In Evropa I Raspad 
Jugoslavije,( Europe and Dissolution of Yugoslavia), 1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada, Institut Za 
Evropske Studije, Beograd (Institution for European Studies), Beograd, pp. 129-35
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than thirty years, the constant changes of legislations, created a situation with no 
legal security for citizens and wider for the society.
2.5. Nationalism In Former Yugoslavia
Despite all national and religious differences, the LCY was a driving and unifying 
force among Yugoslavs. While Tito was still alive there were no serious national 
problems for they were kept under the “ice box”. 55
The first Yugoslavia had been characterized by the Serb hegemony, a fact that 
remained much the same in the second one. The latter favored the centralism and 
Yugoslavism, tenets that were considered by other Yugoslav nations (mainly by 
Croats), as Serb hegemony. On the other side the Serb did not see it that way. 
Thus, Dobrica Cosic, one of the most prominent Communist Serb writer and the 
future president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-93), stated in 1961 
that development of common Yugoslav culture was hindered by the Federal 
Republics and their bureaucracies. This statement shows the hidden Serb claims 
and tendencies for hegemony over the other Yugoslav nations .56
By considering the centralism and Yugoslavism as their tool for the realization of 
their aims, the number of Serbs and Montenegrins in the Party in the late 1960s 
grew up disproportionately to their respective populations. Since the Party was the 
power base, the Serbs and Montenegrin formed the most influential Communist
55 At the Time, Cosic attacked the dangers of non-Serbian ethnic and regional nationalism in
polemics with Slovenian communist intellectuals. This polemic was cited in “ Jugoslovenstvo kao 
Srpski Nacionalizam”,(Yugoslavism as a Serb Nationalism), Vreme, vol.2, no.41 ( August 5, 
1991), p.21,
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elite in Yugoslavia. This is the reason why in the period after 1945 up to 1966, the 
“unitarism” came to be under increasingly strong attack from most of Yugoslavia’s 
non Serbs. In Tito’s Yugoslavia as well the Serb-Croat relations remained 
frustrated in the same way as earlier. This is the reason why the system remained 
bipolar when it comes to the national question so that Serbia and Croatia remained 
still the major actor in the system.
It was a period when the confrontation between the new economic and scientific 
elite and the old politically and military elite reactivated all rivalries between 
different national communities and started with the “Croatian Spring”. That began 
in late 1960s and early 1970s as a cultural movement and was led by many of 
Croatia’s most distinguished intellectuals who were motivated by the alleged fact 
that the Croats risked losing their separate national identity within unitary 
Yugoslav state. As the movement became more militant, it also began to take an 
anti-Serb character .56 7 The student leaders joined that movement by asking that 
students have say in Croatia’s affairs as well.
Tito was aware of the seriousness of the problem. For that he decided to intervene 
so that the “Croatian Spring” would end in a series of arrests, the banning of 
certain nationalist publications, the close of the “Matica Hrvatska” (well known 
nationalist cultural club) and the purge of the Croatian society from the 
“undesirable elements” and the replacement of those element s with reliable Party
56 Reneo Lukic & Alen Lynch ,1996, Europe From the Balkans to the Urals,The Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, SIPRI, pp.57-97; Janusz Bugajski,1992, Nations in Turmoil, 
Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Europe, Weswiew Press pp. 90-105
57 Judah op.cit. pp. 145-146
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cadres, mostly of Serbian and Montenegrin ethnic background .58 One of 
important long-term effect of Tito’s purge in Croatia was that it deepened the gap 
of mistrust between the majority Croat population and the Serb minority living 
there. There should be no doubt about Tito’s sincere motive, that is, he did not 
undertake these purges on anti-Croat basis. He knew that the other way around 
would have meant causing other problems much more serious than the existing 
ones. To counteract these actions, after his visit to Rumania in 1971, Tito gathered 
his comrades and said: If you saw what I see for the future in Yugoslavia, It would 
scare you all”.59 This was a prelude to the purges in Serbia against the so-called 
liberal stream within the LCY. These events paved the way for other, mostly 
positive, undertakings in Kosovo by Tito and his comrades.
Compared with other nation in Yugoslavia, the Albanians had a very different 
position. During the twenty years of Communist rule, Tito made little attempt to 
integrate Albanians into Yugoslav society. They were left at the mercy of the state 
security apparatus and the secret police, which were dominated by the Serbs. This 
meant that the Albanians had very much a second class position.60 During this 
time, they were not able to organize a substantial national movement. Up to the 
1960s they had a generally anti-Communist orientation, and were predominantly 
linked to émigré organizations like “Balli Kombetar" (“National Front”) and 
“Legaliteti” (The Royalist Supporters of King Zogu).61 But with the fall of 
Alexander Rankovic (1996), the Tito’s hard-line police chief, policy towards
58 Sabrina Ramet, 1992, Balkan Babel, Politics, Culture, and Religion in Yugoslavia, Wesview 
Press
59 Benett op.cit. pp. 66
60 Malcolm, 1998, Kosovo A Short History,op.c\t pp.66
61 Shkelzen Maliqi, Non-Violent Resistance of Albanians. In Conflict or Dialogue: Serbian -  
Albanian Relations and Integration of the Balkans, 1990, Subotica: Open University-European 
Civic Centre for Conflict Resolution ; Knocking on Europe’s Conscience- Kosovo: Evidence and 
Documents ,1992, (Prishtina : CDHRF)
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Kosvo changed. It was a part of the overall liberal trends of the time. They were 
legalized as well by the constitutional changes made after the fall of Rankovic 
leading to the 1974 Constitution. Yet, the Albanian nationalist movement remained 
weak and diffusive up to 1981.
Poor living conditions, repression and the second class position of the Albanians 
led to the street demonstrations in the capital of Kosovo, Pristina, in 1968. They 
were in a way a response to the conclusion of the discussions on republican status 
for Kosovo. In fact, the call for republic had already been made, at least 
rhetorically, and by implication, when the senior Communist Mehmet Hoxha asked 
in April 1968: “Why do 370.000 Montenegrins have their republic, while 1.2 
million Albanians do not even have total autonomy...” ,62 The police reacted 
forcefully, and one demonstrator was killed. In the following month forty-four 
people were given prison-sentence.
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina as well had their own problems. In most of 
the cases they were denied the fact about whether they were nations or not. In 
Macedonia’s case, the Slav Macedonians had been recognized as a nation as far 
back as in 1946, still they insisted their language and descent be given a different 
status from the other Slavic neighbors. In the case of the Muslim, on the other 
hand, regional and cultural heritage was accepted as a sufficient basis for national 
identity, despite the fact that Bosnia -Herzegovina did not fulfill the narrow 
interpretation of the concept of the nation, which would include only peoples of the 
same race, religion, language and culture .63 At the end, the Muslims of Bosnia-
62 Malcolm, op.cit. pp. 325
63 Raju G. C. Thomas, History, religion and National Identity. In The South Slav Conflict,History, 
Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism ,1996, (ed. by) Raju G. C. Thomas & Richard Farkas, Garland
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Herzegovina were recognized as an ethnic group in 1961 and in the fourth congress 
of the Bosnia -  Herzegovina’s Communists, they were assured of their right to 
self-determination. From strategic point of view, Tito recognized the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina for Yugoslav gains in the Middle East and North Africa. By 
supporting the Bosnian Muslim campaign for national status, Tito had in his hands 
an asset for the Yugoslav influence among Muslim countries in the above areas.
In Slovenia there were few national problem, as it had been the case with the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This was made possible by the mere fact that it was 
ethnically homogenous, had a high level of economic development and developed 
civil society. Slovenia received first “internal foreigners” only after the Oil Shock” 
in 1973. This crisis forced the internal migration within Yugoslavia because 
impoverished Serbs, Muslims and the Albanians from Kosovo found employment 
in the rich Slovenia at the time, the arrival of non- Slovenes was perceived as a 
threat to their cultural independence and public opinion showed that 1970 
nationalism waves in Yugoslavia were more intense in Slovenia than elsewhere ,64
To sum this up, it could be said that Tito years were generally as years of 
ascendance, prosperity and repeatability for Yugoslavia, and the national question 
except for a few isolated instance, did not raise its ugly head.65 Yet, it should be 
admitted that the outside pressure had a great effect on this Yugoslav solidarity. 
After the Prague events of 1968, it became especially obvious that the Soviet threat
Publishing,Inc. For an interpretation of the Bosnian Muslim Identity,See Ivo Banac, The National 
Question in Yugoslavia op. cit pp. 359-377; Noel Malcolm, Bosnia, A Short History.
64 Ljubljana University, Research Institute of the Faculty of Sociology, Political Science and 
Journalism, A  Survey Research on the Class Composition of the Contemporay Yugoslav Societes, 
Ljubljana, May, 1988
“ Magasop.cit.79-83; Almondop.cit 150-170
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was imminent. Hence, the Yugoslavs would sacrifice their internal quarrel very 
easily for the benefit of common prosperity and stability of the region as a whole.
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CHAPTER ffl : BEGINNING OF THE DISSOLUTION
3.1. Inherent Causes ( Hidden Nationalisms)
Even during Tito's reign, the national question was the most important one. Still 
the CPY and its elite believed that this problem in the Yugoslav federation did not 
exist for the alleged reason that it had been solved properly. They really believed 
in the Yugoslav Federation, that even on the eve of the revival of nationalism, 
Vladimir Balearic, the president of the Central Committee of the League of 
Communist of Croatia, declared in one interview that" the national question plays 
very small role among ordinary people, that youth are not very interested on it, and 
that the nationalism as a mass phenomenon does not exist and has its place among 
bureaucrats and the intelligence “. 1 For the CPY, the devolution of power in the 
Constitution of 1974 was considered the best achievement of the Yugoslav system, 
thus equalizing the voices for any injustice engaged with national question. This 
new approach would yield still unsatisfactory results. As soon the balance of power 
within the country shifted towards the republics,' it become possible for the 
opposition to manifest itself, and to rise the voices of unssatisfaction.2
With the introduction of the constitution of 1974, the republics had a role of the 
center of gravitation and with the new consensus rule, it was meant that any change 
in the constitution and therefore any recasting of the federation would be a long 
and complicated process. These rules prevented the federation from being re­
1 Borba,6 March 1966
2 Pavkovic, 1997, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, op.cit. pp.75-80
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legitimized through the federal elections, thus, the republics gained a new role. In 
each case they were identified with the majority nation. This was the first step 
towards the new nationalism that resulted in a “constitutional nationalism” and 
later on completed the process of " ethnification" of communist policies that had 
started during the years of 1970's. 3 In this way nationalism that has been 
preserved in the "ice box" during Tito's time touched fingers with the national 
politics that had been developing throughout the centrifugal evolution of the party- 
state, by the late 1980 and early 1990, that had reemerged with the “ thaw” of 
collapsing communism. And, as the Yugoslav crises worsened the phenomenon of 
"nationalist transfer" gradually spread to all communities and republics and later it 
caused the tragic dissolution developments.
This hidden nationalism , that suddenly manifested itself was produced within the 
very structure of the Yugoslav system. This system prevented any frank 
discussions on the national question, by suppressing the national feelings and by 
promoting them, at the same time, into a forbidden and valuable agendas.4 The 
CPY tried to solve it through doctrine of brotherhood and unity , which become a 
slogan, fulfilling the ironic destiny, that started to be exploited after the death of 
Tito. This communist ideology did not anticipate the way of political modernism. 
Instead, they used ideological dogmas and appealed for the unification that 
comprehended ideological an political unification without taking into consideration 
all the great differences between nations in terms of political and cultural
3 R.Hayden, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Former Yugoslav Republics”, Slavic 
Review,vol.51,1992, pp.654-73 ; Lidija R. Basta . op. cit.pp. 133-34
4 Vladimir Goati, 1992, The Tragedy of Yugoslavia, (ed by) Seroka and Pavlovic, op.cit.3-12; Paul 
Shoup, 1992, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia, op.cit. pp.61
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traditions, level of economic developments, patterns of social organization and
sheer size.5
On the other hand, the Communist Federation of Yugoslavia could not have been 
sufficient to satisfy the demands for greater autonomy. It was this the reason that 
were the demonstrations of March and April of 1981 were organized in Kosovo. 
The demonstrators claimed for Kosova full republican status (the Republic of 
Kosovo ), convinced that the Albanians had already reached the point of being the 
factor in Yugoslavia due to the "qualitative changes" in the 1974 Constitution.6 
But once again and guided by the communist ideology, without taking into 
consideration and without making any concession to the demonstrators, the 1981 
revolt was suppressed by the brutal force. The Kosovo issue and the Albanian 
question were sidelined by the Communist elite. In this case, as with the others, 
there was decided in a very beurocratic way, without living any space for a 
dialogue inside society. This form of leading by the Communists made it possible 
the further development of Albanian nationalism from "anti-national" towards 
"national" and to end-up in "nationalistic" as the way to searching for the "new 
identity".7 These were mistakes of the system and of the Communist ideology, 
with their political dominance in political sphere throughout the post-War period in
5 Zagorka Golubovic, 1995,”Pojava Iskljucivog nacionalizma Nasuprot demokratskim Procesima U 
Post-Komunistickoj Jugoslaviji’Mn Evropa I Raspad Jugoslavije, 1995 (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada 
op. cit. pp. 139-147; Zagorka Golubovic, 1995,”Emergance of Nationalist Peculiarities Opposite of 
Democratic Processes In Post- Communist Yugoslavia”.In Europe and Dissolution of Yugoslavia 
,1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada op.cit. pp. 139-147
6 Louis Zanga, Why New Unrest in Kosova. In “Radio Free Europe Bacground Report, March 
23, 1981; Bajram Kosumi, Pse I Organizuam Demonstratat me 1981( How We Organized the 
Demonstrations in 1981) Koha .Prishtina , no.6, 3March,pp.31-8 ; Rexhep Ismajli, “The Right to 
Self- Determination”. In Kosovo in the Heart of the Powder Keg, 1997, (compiled and ed. by) 
Robert Elsie, East European Monographs, Boulder, pp. 195-206
7 Veton Surroi, “Vicious Circles of the Kosova Pattern “.In Pogledi- Casopis Za Kriticku Teorije 
Drustva I Kulture, vo.2 Split, Travanj-Lipanj 1988
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creating impotence of the society to react and take a grip on politics, that 
contributed to opening of the Pandora's box of nationalism.
This system with the changes of the 1974 Constitution and with the Communist 
management at its head, faced far-reaching difficulty in transforming the 
Communist political system into democratic one, and instead democracy produced 
ethno-nationalism which would become the only surviving competitor on the 
political stage.8 This was the reason that by the end of 1980, it had been created 
the situation whereby every issue, however trivial, acquired ethnic national 
meaning, and in the words of one journalist, spoken in 1989, one could not say in 
Communist Yugoslavia that a given individual was politically inclined to the right 
or left: " The only meaningful political level was Slovene, Croat, Albanian etc. 
This was confirmed as well by another Slovenian journalist, Miha Kovac, to the 
New Left Review in 1988. According to him, nationalism or local interest's of 
Yugoslavia become a kind of surogate for all other political identities, and being 
active in any one of the existing political structure it was possible only on the basis 
of defending the interests of your republic or province.9 Thus, the system that was 
supposed to be ideologically and politically unified after “defeating” the Croat and 
other nationalisms, in the 1970s, turned to be itself most conducive to nationalism.
The nationalism thus appeared in that manner that the differences and not common 
values were to prevail and gain legitimacy in a way that small differences, religion 
and culture among peoples tended to be the focal point among different groups. 
These were later used for the nationalist interpretation of history, selective and 
manipulative version that turned to be the key objective to explaining the
8 George Schoplin.op.cit. pp.81-93
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differences among those various groups.9 10 Napoleon’s saying that " history is 
nothing more than mutually agreed set of lies" nowhere proved as correct as with 
the Serbian and Croatian version of history where each side preserved the 
victimization evidence for themselves and represented the others as villains. 11
After nationalism positioned itself firmly, especially by the mid-1980, the 
relations among the republics were polarized. Although in Yugoslavia the Serbs, 
for instance, shared many common interests with the Montenegrins as well as with 
Macedonians and they have repeatedly courted the Bosnia -  Herzegovina as a 
natural ally, these relations would be utterly changed. Particulary Montenegro 
became sharply polarized between anti- Serbian and pro- Serbia nationalists, 
resulting in a worsening of the political climate among Montenegrins. 12
In worsening of the political climate an impact have had the alreaday existing 
tensions, whereby all nationalists from the Former Yugoslavia, particularly the 
Serbs and Croats , continued to insist that their nation was most oppressed. But, 
if one looks at the statistics and other barometers of oppression, the conclusion 
would certainly be that the Albanians and Croats were the most persecuted peoples 
in Yugoslavia instead of the Serbs.13
It is this the background that characterized nationalism of the 1980s, after the 
death of Tito, where many frustrations of contemporary epoch and of modern
9 Interview, Miha Kovac: “The Slovene Spring”, New Left Review,no.\l \ (September-October 
1988),pp.115
10Raju G.C.Thomas, 1996, The South Slav Conflict, op.cit. pp.17
11 ibid, pp.17
l2Borba, July 28/29, 1990,p.l3. See also- Vjesnik, July23,1990,p.3, Borba,
Novemeberl3,1990p. 13,1990. See also Vjesnik,Octoberl3,1990,p.5
13 Benett,op.cit,pp.78
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society provided a fertile psychological ground for nationalism and lied a strong 
basis that during the end of the 1980s became the driving force towards the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.
The rise and fall of the nationalism in Yugoslavia cannot be analyzed through its 
deprivation from one of the main segments, that is, without taking into account 
self-management and economy in which the State was both anywhere and 
nowhere. Yugoslav version of Socialism proved to be very fertile ground for the 
most aggressive nationalism in modern Europe.
3.2. Problems Coming Out of the Implementation of the Self-Management
To explain the Yugoslav crisis in all its aspects, one has to deal with one its main 
features, that is, with the self-management as one of the driving forces towards the 
Yugoslav crisis. Theoretically, me founding fathers of the self-management had 
only good intentions for they wanted to embrace and apply a new system of 
values. What was missing was the reality. In practice this application turned to be 
completely out of the way that was meant and comprehend.
Self-management as one of the characteristics that distinguished Yugoslavia from 
other Socialist systems, conceived that the workers as the performers of the work, 
should be granted the rights to conduct and control the conditions and results of 
their work performance. From them, it was required the participation in decision­
making process on issues of great concern, including both the production process
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and social policy.14 This meant that the workers, as the main participants of the 
work, had to make the decisions in conducting their work as well as to participate 
in the distribution of those goods.
Yugoslavia had been the first place that put the self-management into. The roots of 
idea, from a historical perspective, can be traced back in the form of the two 
models: one has to do with the model of the self-government that traces a line back 
to Prudhon and the other followed the Gramcsi’s footsteps. However, both models 
fall short when separating production from distribution, a goal that Yugoslav 
model aspired to put into practice.15
The conditions that caused the adaptation of self management stemmed from three 
factors. First, expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform had a deep impact on 
choosing and developing the independent way of Socialist system. To adopt a new 
policy, the CPY began to criticize the absence of self-management and the 
existence of the great centralized power of the state over the economy. Second 
motive for adaptation of the instrument of self-management lies in, at least at the 
beginning, the necessary reform because the difficulties created in the economic 
sphere by Stalin’s blockade shook the very bases of the new Socialist system of 
Yugoslavia. And a third motive for reform, which was probably only of minor 
importance at the beginning, but which steadily grew in influence as the years 
passed, was the suspicion felt by the non-Serb nations for any kind of centralized 
political and economic system.16 On this latter point there was clear inner 
contradiction within the system and the CPY in order to appease the voices of
14 Zagorka Golubovic, “Charachteristics, Limits and Perspectives of Self-Government, Critical 
Reassesment”. In Yugoslavia in Turmoil after Self- Management, 1991, (ed.by) James Simmie and 
Joze Dekleva, Pinter Publishers,pp.33
15 ibid, pp.34-5
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grievance took further steps by laying the faith under so-called self-managing 
Socialism, thinking that it was manageable instrument in creating conditions that 
would make possible solution in the future. Yet, the CPY’s confidence that the 
combination of authentic federalism and self-managing Socialism would provide 
for the national question to be “correctly formulated” proved infeasible.
Self-management did not serve as the moral force for the unity of the socialist­
managing community of nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia. In theory, this 
instrument was seen as the most appropriate one, considering that the economic 
response will abate the political crisis.16 7 In turn, it produced a negative impact on 
overall structure of the society, deepened further the political and economic 
problems.
The big discrepancies of the self-management that proved its miscarriage in the 
implementation were the contradictory aspects from the way it was anticipated and 
applied into the practice. The naïve view saw the self-management as if the 
workers were given the right to elect a “Worker’s Council” and other bodies to 
discuss major questions of policy. These rights, in turn, were meant to be used to 
safeguard workers’ interests and further the interests of the whole “collective “ 
and, at the same time, the interests of the society as a whole. What was missing 
from this “Utopian “ view, was the recognition of the existing conflicts of interest 
between groups within an enterprise and existing problems between the workers in 
an enterprise and the “society “ in the other.18
16 Harold Lydall, 1984, Yugoslav Socialism Theory & Practice, Clarendon Press Oxford, pp.67
17 Laslo Sekelj, 1993, Yugoslavia the Process of Disintegration, Columbia University Press, New 
York
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Although, there were the elements of workers self-management in the practice, in 
the Yugoslav enterprises, it is impossible to hold the stance that the workers really 
managed. Still, theoretically, they carried out and had in their control the major 
business decisions. In practice, though, the decisions were exclusively in the hands 
either of the management or, especially in recent years, of the local or regional 
politicians.18 9
It was not surprising that the self-managed worker felt himself manipulated. The 
enterprise benefits were manipulated, and the worker did not know who was doing 
that, the accountant, the lawyer, the director or somebody else. The worker’s role 
was only to attending the meetings. Meetings ended with the formal voting on 
various points, and the worker’s consent served only as an official endorsement 
that was required. For this reason no one asked anything and no one voted 
.against.20
In manipulating the enterprises the direct role was played by the CPY, since 
directors were selected by the Party, mainly on the political grounds, well until the 
second half of 1960. This political interference with running the economic 
enterprise was done by the CPY. The reason was that some professional managers 
of the enterprise acquired a big power position in decision-making process. That 
risked the CPY’s role. Besides, this ’’ownership group” threatened the Socialist 
principles of “solidarity and equity”.21 In fact, when Party saw how much 
expanded the role of managers, it took fright. It saw the danger of becoming
18 S. Goldstein,” Prijedlog 85”, Glas iz Privrede ( “Proposal 1985”, A Voice From the Economy) 
Jugoslavia, Zagreb 1985
19 David A. Dyker, 1990, Yugoslavia Socialism, Development and Debt, Routledge, pp.53-54
20 Harold Lydall, 1989, Yugoslavia in Crisis, Clarendon Press , pp.107
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redundant. The CPY, in order to remaining in its positions, intervened by giving 
the managerial position to the CPY loyal members ,21 2
This form of self-management in Yugoslavia brought deformations within the 
system, such as bureaucratic stagnation. Furthermore, these factors generated new 
tensions. To overcome this, more reforms had to be introduced and that in a very 
bureaucratic manner. As the time passed, this logic led to the system’s ultimate 
failure. With the 1974 Constitution, it was made an attempt to defuse these 
manipulative elements of the system and to maintain a single-party rule while 
broadening the scope for the decentralized activity. It inevitably broke-up the 
system’s identity. 23
From the above, one can conclude that self-management needed a different kind of 
regulator-type of democracy in order to .have realized its potentials for progress. 
Thus, the performance of the Yugoslav self-management in the absence of political 
democracy proved to be fatal. The same occurred to the Perestroika of 
Gorbachev, with the plans for sweeping economic changes. It failed just after 500 
days, as it had Khruschev’s utopian promise of “developed communism’.24 Self 
management raised expectations but it failed to deliver on them. It was both a 
cause of success and of the very crises within the system itself during all the time 
Yugoslavia existed.
21 Self Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, Naval A. El Tatawy, Yugoslavia, 1979 (published for the World 
Bank), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London
22 Bogdan Dentich, 1990, Limits and Possibilities, The Crisis of Yugoslav Socialism and State 
Socialist System, Minnesota Press, pp.52-58
23 Catherine Samary, op.cit. 112
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2.3. Collapse of the Economy
As we have seen self-management hindered the prosperity of the Yugoslav 
economy, being leaded in an ad hoc basis, by complex administrative business, and 
party cadres. This was to be the kernel of the negative impact on the Yugoslav 
state, which led to a bureaucratization of the society and recession of the economy 
until its total collapse.
Economic crises that swept Yugoslav system had an impact in the overall structure, 
especially during the 1980s and 1990s, exacerbated the system and deepened the 
already existing gap in the relations among the republics. Some argue that the 
economic crises were considered as the main factor of the dissolution. Yet, it was 
only one of the factors that caused dissolution for the prominent ones to cause it 
were of the political nature mainly. In favor of this approach is the statement of the 
Slovenian sociologist who said that “the roots of the crisis are not of economic 
nature’’....24 5 For the authors who argue that the roots of dissolution were of 
economic nature, the crises until the 1980s followed those of 1974, with one 
difference, that is, the absence of Tito’s charismatic personality. Among them is 
Zagorka Golubovic. In trying to illuminate the causes of the dissolution of former 
Yugoslavia, she argues that “the peoples did not look for the rational way of going 
out of the circles of the economic crises so that they had to search for the "scape 
goats”. Furthermore, she argues that "the real object that they found was that the 
dominant nation was establishing the hegemony over the others".26 It is not our
24 Nina L. Krushcheva,”The Ghost of Perestroika, Gorbachev Remembered”, Transition, vol.5 no.3 
March 1998, pp.68-70
25 Gantar Pavel, Tomaz Mastnak, Silva Meznaric and Lev Sergej,” Yugoslavia’s Permanent Crisis”, 
East European Reporter, vol.2 no.2,1986 pp.46-50
26 Zagorka Golubovic, Evropa I Raspad Jugoslavie, 1995, (ed,. by) Radmila Nakarada, op.cit. 
pp.145
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aim to thoroughly discuss at this point the contentious issue as to which were the 
real causes of Yugoslav dissolution. It will be discussed later again.
It was obvious from the beginning that the stability of the Yugoslav system 
depended on its capacity to overcome the first Yugoslavia’s failures and that in 
two ways: first, to overcome the country's underdevelopment and, the second, to 
reduce regional inequalities. This task was priority agenda for the CPY, but in 
practice it never realized. These divergences on the regions proved to be a fertile 
soil for extremist movements, because economic problems struck different regions 
and nations in different ways. Or, to put in another way, economic disparities 
between regions, self-management, decentralization reforms and economic crises, 
induced regional economic nationalism within Yugoslavia.27 The latter became 
pivotal factor in impairing the overall stability of Yugoslavia.
From the outset, the CPY aimed at achieving of the equality among the regional 
disparities. For this reason they adopted the instrument of "policy of aid" for the 
underdeveloped regions, by promoting the special fund and accelerating the 
development of impoverished regions. These reforms were necessary since the 
critical phase in the development of the Yugoslav Communist system came in the 
1960s.28 This strategy of reform had as well other political goal. It was meant to 
shift control out of the political sphere and vest in the banking system ,since most 
of the big banks had their offices in Belgrade and they tended to be seen in other 
republics as Serbia’s banks, operating in Serbia interests. To lower the grievances 
of the republics, the CPY needed the new packet of reforms. This new approach of
27 Boris Pleskovic and Marjan Dolenc,” Regional Development in a Socialist, Developing and 
Multinational Country”: The case of Yugoslavia”, International Regional Science Review, vol.7 
no.l, 1982 p.3
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reforms faced the considerable opposition in Serbia, and in reaction they adopted 
an attitude of the passive resistance. In this way the investments in Serbia rose by 
nearly 12% while in the rest of the country by only 5%.28 9 Unsatisfied with the 
investment situation, Party leaders in Slovenia and Croatia and to some extent 
elsewhere become very critical of the "centralist" regime that Serbia was pursuing. 
They began campaign to break this opposition and the sabotage of the reform, by 
requiring the economic liberalization and decentralization of the system.
The problem in itself was Kosova, being the most underdeveloped region. Tito’s 
regime and those who ruled after him were aware that interregional economic 
realities would threaten the integrity of the Yugoslav Community and Kosova 
might explode in violence. In one visit to the Kosova region, Tito remarked that 
benefits from the raw materials had never reached the region of Kosova.30 He 
promised that in future the investments would increase other production sectors. 
The promise was never realized in practice. Kosova remained the most 
impoverished area in former Yugoslavia due to the policy of investing only in the 
heavy industry and for the purpose of milking its natural resources. 31
Aid policy for Kosova and other underdeveloped regions proved to be a failure. At 
the outset it was promising that the reform undertaken would entail radical 
changes, but it proved opposite and the 1970s would mark the last decade of the
28 Dijana Plestina,1992, Regional Development in Communist Yugoslavia, Success, Failure 
and Consequences, Westview Press, pp.57-62
29 Lydall, 1989, op.cit.84
30 “Fjalimet e fundit te Josip Broz Titos dhe Eduard Kardelit , ne Aktivin Politik te KSA te 
Kosoves”,(The Last Speeches of Josip Broz Tito and Eduard Kardelj, in Autonomy Province of 
Kosova), Komunisti, Prishtine 1981, pp.7
31 Christine Von Kohl& Wolfang Libal,” Kosovo the Gordian Knot Of the Balkans”. In Kosovo in 
the Heart of Powder Keg, 1997 (ed. by) Elsie op.cit pp.50
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growth. Yugoslavia was never managed to develop a common pattern and become 
a truly integrated economic area, and no doubt that this economic disparity 
exacerbated inter-ethnic conflict among the republics and autonomous provinces.32
Communist system and the monopoly of the Party were as well catalyst of the 
crises. During the 1960s and 1970s more than a million Yugoslavs moved abroad 
to live and work. New middle class was emerging. It faced the limits of the 
Communist system, both in terms of initiative in economic sphere and investments. 
The bulk of private property and economic activity was under control of the 
League of Communists. This way of control made the individuals demotivated, and 
without prospective. Running economy under control of the CPY, created for the 
politicians a possibility to use all the means for their benefits. Among the most 
powerful instruments in their hands were the rotation of credit, foreign exchanges 
and vague regulation.33 This way of management created bureaucratization of the 
society, and at the same time generated two-way track conflict, one among the 
entities of Yugoslavia and the other within them.
Nevertheless, economy of Yugoslavia began to decline with the hike in oil prices, 
in the Wake of the First Oil Shock. At the time, the only salvation from the crises 
was found in foreign loans, like so many countries in the Third World from Poland 
to Mexico.34 The debt in fact marked the beginning of the end for the system. All 
the founds were used by the regions of Yugoslavia, without exceeding the borders. 
Investments went mainly to the privileged and protected sectors of society and that
32 Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnia and Hercegovina- State and Communitarism “. In Yugoslavia and After 
, 1996,(ed.by)Dyker, Vejvoda
33 David A. Dyker, 1990, Yugoslavia, Socialism, Development and Debt, op.cit. pp.63-66
34 Susan L.Woodward, 1995, Balkan Tragedy,Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, the 
Brookings Institution Washington DC pp.47
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led to the significant over capacity:-5 If all those sums were invested wisely 
Yugoslavia might have been saved from the economic collapse of the 1980s, but 
they were not. Investments become factor that far from promoting cohesion had 
not only failed to diminish national differences, but also actually exacerbated them. 
The north and south complained. The North complained of excessive waste in 
southern investments, considering them as the “black holes”, and the southern parts 
considered that, in the long run, the development of the south was the most rational 
strategy. 35 6 Despite all these crises and an abortive structural reform, the ruling 
political elite never gave up the idea of controlling in a hegemonic way the 
political situation and the investments. This monopoly impaired and brought the 
crises to its vicious circle.
The situation worsened by October 1987. Inflation hit 200% and by August 1989 it 
would be 893.8%. That brought Yugoslav economy to its total collapse.37 
Marxism- Leninism was an economic catastrophe. Yugoslavia fossilized in the 
way the other revolutionary states did, the early dynamism faded, and the original 
revolutionaries burned out.
Because of the crises, that swept Yugoslavia throughout, Prime Minister of the 
time Mikulic resigned. His successor was appointed Ante Markovic. The reforms 
that he undertook came to full legitimacy in the period when the party elite had lost 
its credibility, and the new political elite had not yet come to power. His policy 
package was based on the “Socks Plan” for Poland., and he was liberal who
35 Bruce Mcfarlane,1988, Yugoslavia, op.cit. pp. 127 ; Ivo Bicanic, “Fractured Economy”. In 
Yugoslavia a Fractured Federalism , 1988 (ed. by) Rusinow, op.cit. pp.132
36 Dijana Plestina op.cit. pp.75 ; Schierup ,C.U. “Prelude to Inferno-Economic Disintegration and 
Political Fragmentation of Yugoslavia”, Balkan Forum, no.8 , pp.89-120
37 E. ZiZmond, 1991, “Specificnosti Inflacije u Jugoslaviji”,( Specifities of Inflation in 
Yugoslavia), (Zagreb, Naprijed);
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believed that the only possible exit from Yugoslavia's economic inertia was a
n a
switch to a free market economy and privatization of the economy. His policy 
was very promising, and the first concrete measures in a recovering of the 
economy were the new dinar , strictly tied to the German Mark. Making the 
Yugoslav dinar convertible and centralizing all values and foreign currency 
payments, it made it possible to increase the foreign currency payments. During 
this time reserves of the country reached $ 5.1 billion, due to 15% increase of 
export.38 9 This led to a flood of foreign currency into the National Bank. From 
these transcanctions mostly benefited the Serbian Banks making possible to place a 
large portion of the resultant foreign currency into the National Banks in foreign 
countries, particularly in Cyprus, throughout banks in Europe and America.40
Economy in a way started to recover, but the political scene was becoming very 
turbulent, since from the autumn of 1987 it has been dominated by Slobodan 
Milosevic From than onwards, the communist ideology could no longer provide 
political legitimacy on a long-term. The essential crises that followed those of 
economic nature, would be now on the scene: Who should rule after Tito ?!
Western Governments and "experts" remained in thrall to the naive idea that 
Yugoslavia's problems were primarily economic and therefore believed that if only 
prices would stabilize, than the political tensions inside the Federation would melt 
away. Still, the west seemed unaware that Milosevic’s concept of a recentralised 
Yugoslavia was incompatible with Markovic's free market vision of Yugoslavia.
38 Paris Kitsos, “A Glimpse of Yugoslav Economy”, Hellenic Foundation For Defense and Foreign 
Policy, Yearbook 1989, (special issue), Southern Eastern Europe, Eliamep, pp.187
39 ibid pp. 188
40 W. Raymon Duncan& G. Payl Hofman 1992 (eds.),” Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict. 
The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Westview Press Inc, pp.205
66
The two political actors were not in one line. 41 When Slobodan Milosevic illegally 
extracted from the National Bank of Yugoslavia $ 1.8 billion, just prior to the 
Serbian elections, policy of Ante Markovic went underway. 42 Milosevic 
succeeded in remaining the only political actor and proved that political factor can 
prevail over economy.
3.4. Wrong Turn In Kosova
Since the death of Tito, the Yugoslav federation plunged into most severe 
economic and political crises it had experienced since its expulsion in 1948, from 
the Communist bloc controlled by Stalin. The Yugoslav economy fragmented into 
six "republican" economies, each run by its local communist elite, plagued by huge 
burden and a spiraling inflation, led to abyss of the state. This bankruptcy had 
impact on the Serbs, thinking that the crises had particularly affected them. The 
demonstrations of Albanians in 1981 that broke out in Kosova proved as well that 
Communist Party was incapable of halting continued Albanian political unrest. 
There were two reasons that, in 1986, forced the Serb Academy of Arts and 
Sciences to commission a committee, composed of well-known Serb writers, 
economists, philosopher, historians and linguists, to draft a memorandum 
addressing the causes of the continuing crises in Yugoslavia and proposing 
remedies. 43 This draft would be a guide to forge the Serbs aspirations, in
41 Reneo Lukic and Alen Lynch,” U.S Policy Towards Yugoslavia: From Differentation to 
Disintegration”. In The South Slav Conflict, 1996 (ed. b y ) Thomas, Friman op. cit. Pp.253-287
42 Almond, op.cit.15; Warren Zimmerman, United States last ambassador to Belgrade( Yugoslavia), 
admits the exertion of $1.8 billion by Milosevic, and says that he might have used the money for 
financing the election campaign of December 1990. See Warren Zimmermann, 1996, Origins of a 
Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers: America’s Last Ambasador Tells What Happened and 
Why. ( Albanian translation by “ Besa”. Publishing House. Tirana Albania ,1997,p.92)
43 For the full text of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, in Serbo- 
Croatian, see, "Nose Teme” 33 (l-2).Zagreb, 1989 pp.128-163. For its essencial parts in English, 
see, Fehmi Pushkolli - Limon Rushiti - Fehmi Rexhepi - Jusuf Bajraktari -  Izber Hoti (ed.)
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embodying the line of the turmoil and detorietantion of the country toward the 
break-up.44
The draft in its first part, offered a wide range, but essentially Marxist critique of 
the economic and social policies of the Yugoslav Communist Party since the early 
1960s. The second, shorter part, entitled "the Status of Serbia and the Serbian 
Nation” arguing that from the early 1960s the Serb nation was subjected to 
discrimination throughout Yugoslavia, especially with the constitution of the 1974, 
considering as the act of preventing the Serbian people to complete national and 
cultural integrity.45 Furthermore, they have designated their ambitions on their 
foreign policy for accomplishment of the national goals. Although the 
Memorandum was supposed to be confidential, it was soon after published in the 
Serbian press.
After the publication, the Memorandum was immediately denounced and 
repudiated by Ivan Stambolic, president of the Serbain Communists, considering 
the Memorandum "as nothing else but the darkest nationalism".46 He made clear as 
well his opposition to "nationalistic poisoning of the youth". 47 But there is no 
doubt that it touched some sensitive nerves. It was witnessed in the VIH Session of 
the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia held in September 
1987, when a hard line fraction led by LCS President Slobodan Milosevic defeated 
the more liberal faction led by Serbia's president Ivan Stambolic and Belgrade
Expulsion of Albanians and Colonization of Kosova. Institute of History of Kosova and the Kosova 
Information Center. Prishtina, pp.80-87
44 Aleksandar Pavkovic, From Yugoslavism to Serbism: The Serb National Idea 1986-1996, Nation 
and Nationalism,volA Part4 October 1998
45 Philip J. Cohen, "The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 1990s". In This Time 
We Knew, Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, 1996, (ed. by) Thomas Cushman and Sjepan 
G. Mestrovic, New York University Press, pp.39-65
46 John R. Lampe, op.cit. pp.340
47 ibid. op. cit. pp.339
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Party Chief Dragisa Pavlovic 48 Triumph of Milosevic was the content of the new 
ideology of the new power-holders, based on nationalism. From that moment 
Milosevic clearly understood the potential strength of nationalism in Serbia and 
relied heavily on it.
Milosevic in particular wanted a new strategy in the political scene, the strategy 
that was backed from the Serb intellectuals, and which began to regard Miliosevic 
the most appropriate person in execution of their aims designed in the blueprint of 
the Memorandum. The new political scene, with the new strategy and with the new 
pivotal force, thus emerged. Playing with the card of nationalism, the new conjure 
relegated an aggressive and authoritarian nationalism based on a critical mass of 
prejudice, ethnocentrism and war-mongering that rendered it different from all 
others nationalisms in Yugoslavia.49
During all this time , the Kosovar Albanians and the Kosova issue would be the 
most discerned flash point. They demanded to be an equal nation of Yugoslavia. 
The situation would be used by Serb nationalists as a means of arousing the 
popular sentiment. It,began with the mass psychological preparation developed 
between 1985-1990, consisting of mass meetings which were professionally 
organized and that continued without interruption from 1986 until the famous 
“Vidovdan meeting” at the Kosova field on June 1989.50 Earlier, on April 1987, 
Milosevic delivered his famous speech and promise to the Serbs by saying that
48 Dragisa Pavlovic, head of the Belgrade communists, on the occasion of his revocation from the 
post in September 1987 ( the famous 8-th Sessesion of the Belgrade communists) warned that Serbs 
could very easily come into the conflict with others if they were to insist on living within one state. 
See, Dragisa Pavlovic, 1988, Olako Obecana Brzina, (Globus, Zagreb) pp.331
49 Slavoljub Djukic, 1992, Kako se Dogodio Vodja, Borbe za Vlast u Srbiji Posle Josip Broza{ How 
The Leader Happened, Fighting ’sfor Power After Josip Broz, )
( Filip Visnjic, Belgrade) pp. 124-130;
50 John Zametica, 1992, The Yugoslav Conflict. Adelphi Paper no.270, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies , pp. 26; Le Monde, July 12, 1989, pp.6; Malcolm op.cit. pp. 188
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"nobody can't beat you any more". It gave the new impetus to the Serbian 
nationalism by marking the highest level of national euphoria, promoting 
psychological preparation and war hysteria and, consequently, implementation of 
the plan for Greater Serbia.
On the other hand, Milosevic was promoted to the new leader, a figure that had the 
potential strength to become an archytypical "autocratic populist" or a cult figure. 
In his way to building the political carrier, Milosevic exploited the Serb 
nationalism rooted among ethnic Serbs, across regions and even republics. The 
manner in which the Serbian nationalism was launched was perhaps not so specific 
in itself. Its uniqueness lies on the form in which it was presented, and the solution 
that was soon offered. These aspects of Serbian nationalism significantly differed 
from other similar cases.51
Milosevic appeared as a specific sample that would have a direct impact in the 
course and the flow of the events that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. These 
samples are not unrecognized for the modem history of the nineteenth Century and 
early period of East-Central European history, that in each of the countries, certain 
individuals emerged and had an enormous impact on the outcomes. On the risks 
posed by Milosevic, after he grabbed the power, Harold Lydall wrote the following 
: " This kind of combination of Serbian nationalism with dogmatic Marxism, will 
create serious danger for the future of Yugoslavia ",52 It became true since 
Milosevic was still an old-style, hard-line Communist leader with equally old-style 
political ideas, and in his political perceivment, there was no place within
51 Jovan Cvijic, Studies in Jugoslav Psychology, Slavonic Review, vo.9,1990/91, pp.668 ; Janusz 
Bugajski, 1993, Nations in Turmoil, op.cit. pp.125 - 136
52 Lydall, 1989, Yugoslavia in Crisis,op.cit. pp.202
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movement's basket for concepts like human rights, civil society, multiparty
democracy.53
Since the Serbian opinion was the most sensitive to the case of Kosova, the first 
promises of Milosevic were that he would make a very quick solution to this 
question. His plan was endorsed by the intellectuals, considering Kosova the 
cradle of the Serbian Nation. Matija Beckovic, head of Serbia’s Writers 
Association, in an Extraordinary Assembly of the Serbian writers on March 4 
1989, declared that" there is so much blood and so many sacred relics that Kosova 
will remain Serbian land, even if not a single Serb remains there".,54 These were 
the mutual outcomes that Milosevic would be viewed by the intellectuals as the 
man of a strong will and apt to establish an efficient and competent regime. To the 
situation much of the help was given by media. From 1987 to 1989 there was an 
offensive focused against Albanians and alleged Islamic conspiracy and Tito's 
vision of Yugoslavia.55
First steps towards the implementation of the promised policy on Kosova would be 
to encourage the new wave of Serb colonists with promises of jobs and houses. 
These were the first initiatives undertaken by the Serbs in order to change ethnic 
balance. The policy was designed to influence the centrifugal forces that56 
sometimes included outside elements so that they clashed with strong ethnocentric 
trends (Albanians had the highest birth rate in former Yugoslavia) in an 
unprecedented manifestation of sociopolitical interstate turmoil. For the first time
53 Slobodan Antonie (1995) Vlada Slobidana Milosevica, Pokusaj Tipoloskog Odregjenja( The 
Government of Slobodan Milosevic ,an Attempt at a Typological Definition ) Srpska Politicka 
Misao, no .l, pp.96-97
54 Sabrina, 1992, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia (1962-1991) op.cit pp. 243
55 Paul Mojzes ,1995, Yugoslavian Inferno op.cit. pp. 82-83, 138-139
56 Benett,op.cit. pp.100
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the dispute transcended Yugoslavia's political scene when on 24th November 1988 
the successor to the Communist dictator of Albania, Ramiz Alija, reacted against 
this Serb policy in an effort "to limit the autonomy and rights of Kosova and all 
Albanians as recognized by the present Yugoslav constitution”. This attack from 
the President of Albania, on behalf of the ethnic Albanians living in the other side 
of the border, made it possible for the Belgrade to accuse Albania of interfering 
with its internal affairs.57
For this reason Kosova has become the new locus of ethnocentric malaise, and 
while the Croatian nationalism and its political consequences represented the 
principal threat to the integrity and stability of the Yugoslav federation in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, Kosova became the most critical source of disequilibrum in 
the country. With the new position based on the 1974 Constitution, Kosova issues 
directly affected relations between Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia and had a 
direct impact in interrepublican balance of power.58
Considering the 1974 Constitution as a barrier act to the implementation of his 
strategy, Milosevic’s next move would be the suspension of the autonomy of the 
provinces. As a result of the so-called "anti-beurocratic revolution" there were 
arrests of the Albanian Kosovar leadership in early March 1989. They were 
charged with "organizing miners hunger strikes and demonstrations" that followed 
in the Kosova province after the changes to its constitution. Changes made on the 
Kosova’s Constitution were as a result of the "force behind".59 It showed that
57 George Harvalis, Albanian Irredentism vs. Serbian Ethnocentrism(The Kosovo Dispute: Threat to 
Balkan Regional Stability) 1989,Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, ( special 
issue) Southeastern Europe, Eliamep, yearbook pp.137-177
58 ibid, pp. 137-177
59 Knocking on Europe’s Conscience-Kosova: Evidence and Documents ,1992,
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Milosevic was eager on recasting the federation by tightening up and reducing 
power of the six constituent republics. The new Serbian position on the federation, 
after the abolition of Kosova’s autonomy, created a new balance of power among 
the republics, having four votes under control. Milosevic managed to have under 
his control, besides Kosova and Vojvodina, the tiny republic of Montenegro.60 On 
the other hand, Milosevic hoped to teach the lesson to the other republics for 
eventual dissobeyance since these actions were to be a model for the future 
behavior of the Serbian leadership towards other republics.61
The new position of Serbia, that turned it into a quasi-federal state, and the regime 
headed by Milosevic, as a communist appartchic who appears to endorse 
rudimentary form of Serbism, with objectives of Greater Serbia, assured a Serbian 
backlash. The Serbian nationalism reached the highest levels of ascendancy and 
provoked other nationalisms. It xeached levels „unknown since W.W.II. That 
marked the beginning of the future break-up of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while 
others nationalisms would have a common features, an obsession with the territory 
and nation who should rule over, the peculiarity of the Serbian nationalism would 
be the type of leadership that they had and the nationalism that they cultivated.62
The wrong turn and one of the main drawbacks of the Serbian policy designed to 
achieve national goals was Kosova, since it lacked the clear ideas as to the way of
( Prishtina; CDHRF); B. Kelmendi and N. Kelmendi,(1992) Dismantling and Serbization of the 
Judical System in Kosova, Kosova Watch, vol.l, no.2. August
60 Srdjan Darmanovic ," Montenegro, Destiny of a Satellite State", East European Reporter, vol.5, 
no.2, March April 1992, pp.28
61 Dan Morgan. "Yugoslavia’s Multiethnic Make Up Could Lead to Its Unraveling".
"Washington Post'. 17,December 1989. Also available in Internet:
http/www. washingtonpost.com/longterm/bosvote/1989htm.
62 Jovan Teokarevic, "Neither War Nor Peace: Serbia and Montenegro in the First half of the 
1990s”. In Yugoslavia and After, 1996, (ed. by) Dyker, Vejvoda
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finding a lasting solution to the Albanian national question” .63 The fact was 
confirmed by Dobrica Cosic in 1993, according to which, the problem of Kosova 
and Albanian political unrest is one of the most serious obstacles to the Serb 
political and economic regeneration: "Kosovo will be to Serbia a malign cancer 
which exhausts it, restricts its development and threatens it”.64
63 Willem Vemer, 1992, Disintegration of Yugoslavia (ed. by) Heuvel, Siccama op. cit. pp.101
64 Pavkovic, 1998, From "Yugoslavism to Serbism", Nations and Nationalism, op.cit pp.522
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CHAPTER IV: THE BREAK-UP OF THE NATION
4.1. The Rich North Heads Toward The Secession ( 1989-91)
Crises on political system of Yugoslavia has started as a consequence of the 
changes made on the constitution of Serbia, whereby Serbia substantially increased 
its influence in the federation by controlling four votes of the collective 
presidency’s eight, instead of one as previously. Kosova/o and Vojvodina as noted 
earlier lost their autonomus status after the constitutional changes to the 1974 
Constitution made by Serbia. The changes that took place in 1989. The policy of 
Milosevic toward Kosova/o decisively determined the political course in the North 
and the events that followed afterwords. 1 As we shall see, after the 1990 elections 
in Slovenia and Croatia, as a reaction to Milosevic’s hegemonic tendencies, the 
fate of the country would hinge on the hands of two leaders, Milosevic and 
Tudjman.2
In response to the events of 1989, Slovene Assembly decided to amend the 
Slovene constitution, allowing multiparty elections, to take place in the Spring of 
the following year. Croatia as well followed Slovenia’s example so that in 
December of 1989 it ordered a constitutional change allowing for such elections. 
Thus, both republics followed Serbia’s example by openly changing a major 
provisions of the 1974 Constitution, replacing one-party rule by the multiparty
1 Carole Rogel, 1998, The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia, Greenwood Press, pp.19- 
222
2 Ivan Vejvoda, 1991, "Electing for War", A Critical Briefing on the Conflict in Yugoslavia, ( 
Yugofax) no.5, 12, October, p.7 ; Misa Glenny, 1996, The fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan
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system. In the North , the changes took place with the consent of republican 
branches of the Communist Party, without reference to the central Party bodies.3 
These changes in both republics were deemed necessary , since they wanted more 
and not less Yugoslavia, as long as Serbia was closely identified with the central 
power of the Yugoslav state.
While in Yugoslavia started the first faze of the political crises, in international 
arena with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 radical changes had been made. 
Gorbachev and his policy of a “ new thinking” for his country and the world, 
removed the sense of external threat that had functioned to produce an artificial 
unity. These changes carried with them the conceptual baggage of “freedom” and “ 
self-determination” and went towards a dramatic metamorphosis of capitalism and 
democracy.4 In this environment the politicans as well assumed new political 
identity in ibe .transition from one-party hegemonic political system in the search 
of democracy and the market. Power players become concerned to establish new 
rules of conflict in a New World Order. Yet, the new Europe was being forged in a 
radically destablilised security environment.5
For Yugoslavs to follow these reforms it was needed much smaller step than for 
their neighbors in Eastern Europe but the international influence further worsened 
the relations among Yugoslavs in an atmosphere of the tense political situation
War, (3rd ed.) New York: Penguin. This author assigns greater responsibility for the war in the 
former Yugoslavia to Croatia and Tudjman than do most of the authors.
3 Milan Andrejevich, “ Slovenia’s State President Calls for Democracy”, Radio Free Europe 
Research, Yugoslavia,lONovemeber 1988, pp.27
4 Christopher Cviic, 1991, Remaking the Balkans, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
Pinter Publishers, pp.87 ; Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio, Politics and Security in 
Southeastern Europe, Westview Press 1991 pp. 121
5 Robin Alison Remington, "Yugoslavia and the Internationalization of the Conflict". In The South 
Slav Conflict, 1996, (ed. by) Thomas, Friman, op.cit. pp. 229-252, Constatine Danopulos & Kostas 
G. Messas,” Ethnonationalism, Security and Conflict in the Balkans”. (eds.)1997. In Crises in the 
Balkans.
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that reigned that time. This was noticed in December 1989, on the eve of the 
fourteenth (Extraordinery) Congress of the CLY, when the Slovenia party leader 
Milan Kucan womed that the country was on the brink of the civil war. Some 
peoples still pinned hopes that any solution would be found on the Congress but it 
proved to be an illusion. The Slovenes being the wealthest republic became 
preoccupied how to join Europe. Even the last congress of the Communist Party of 
Slovenia, was held under the slogan “ Evropa Z da f (Europe Now). 6 Under this 
task they pushed in the Congress for more reforms , than the others could embrace. 
The LCY had for a long been devided into “reformists” and “dogmatic" wings and, 
more important, along territorial lines. In Slovenia and Macedonia the Leagues 
represented a moderate reformist nationalism', while those of Croatia remained 
more conservative. The Congress appeared deadlocked and, in frustration and 
protest, the Slovenian delegation walked out on January 23, causing the entire 
congress to fall apart. The “ Congress of Salavation “ ended into a complete 
fiasco.7 In the absence of the Slovenian delegation, Milosevic attempted to resume 
the Congress, but then the Croatian delegation too walked out, The Bosnian and 
Macedonian Communists were no longer prepared to continue, the meeting was 
suspended.8 The LCY broke-out and it was thwarted any further attempt of 
Milosevic to recentralise Yugoslavia via the LCY.
For the first time in Yugoslavia since 1918, the composing entities of Yugoslavia, 
as well as their populations, felt that they could decide their own destiny and then- 
own future without anyone from the center in Belgrade dictating the rules to them.
6 Dusko Sekulic, "The Creation and Dissolution of the multinational state: The Case of 
Yugoslavia", Nations and Nationlism, 1997, pp. 165-179
7 Tanjug ( March 25,1990), translation in FBIS, Daily Report ( Eastern Europe), Januaryll, 1990, 
p.87
* Borisav Jovic, 1995, Poslednji Dam SFRJ, "Izvodi iz Dnevnika"(The Last Days of SRFJ, “ Parts 
of the Diary”) Belgrade, Politika, pp.88
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After the dissolution of the LCY, in compatibility with their constitutions, Slovenia 
and Croatia held their first parliamentary elections in 1990, that would be the first 
after the post war Yugoslavia. Undoubtedly, these elections symbolize the end of 
an epoch, but also the end of Yugoslavia as a united state. For this reason one 
Yugoslavian politician, causal links between the fall of Communism and the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, found in the process of the victory of nationalist’s 
party’s, in a way considering the federal state as the main obstacle in their 
aspirations.9 And as long as victory was on the edge of the nationalists in all 
Yugoslav federal units, instead of representative democracy, it was established 
ethnodemocracy. Populous has been reduced to ethnos, and post-electoral policy 
only gave a new impetus to this political manipulation of the nation. Furthermore, 
in explaining the very essence of the crises of the Yugoslav state and the 
occurrence of the new political stage after the first multiparty elections in its 
federal units, Italian Foreign Secretary Giani De Miculis , made his comment that 
Yugoslavia could be either united but undemocratic, or democratic but in 
pieces”.10 That perfectly matched the situation after the elections.
The elections were held first in Slovenia. Those of Croatia took place a week after 
the conclusion of Slovenia’s multiparty election ( April, May). In Slovenia the 
winner was Kucan, member of the top Communist elite. In Croatia the election 
was won overwhelmingly by the Croatian Democratic Union, a heterogeneous 
movement and his trumbetary Tudjman who based his campaign squarely on the
9 Zagorka Golubovici, Evropa I Raspad Yugoslavie,( Europe and the Dissolution o f Yugoslavia) 
1995, (ed. by) Radmila Nakarada op. cit. pp. 143; Lenard J Cohen, 1993, Broken Bonds, The 
Desintegration of Yugoslavia, Westview Press 1993, pp. 159-160; Slaven Letica, “ Proizvodnja 
Neprijatelja” ( The Product of Enemey), Danas, April4,1989
10 Borba, May 17,1991
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national question.11 . These elections were followed by those in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina ( October), Macedonia (November) and Serbia and Montenegro 
(December 1990). In Kosova, the elections were boycotted by the majority 
Albanian population.
Intrinsic part of the elections was that they were won by the members of the top 
Communist elite (League of the Communists of Yugoslavia), Kucan in Slovenia, 
Tudjman in Croatia, Milosevic in Serbia and Gligorov in Macedonia. These new 
adoption in a new model varied between the two extremes of Franjo Tudjman, 
once a communist, then a nationalist dissident, finally a nationalist president, and 
Slobodan Milosevic, the classic “nomenclature nationalist” and whose 
transformation from communist appartchik into nationalist leader was almost 
imperceptible.12 After the elections Yugoslavia entered a new turbulent episode. 
That would be calamity of the democratic flow, and would mark the first phase that 
Yugoslavia went one step behind the developments that swept Eastern Europe in 
the democratic transformation.
To make the situation more tense helped media. It manipulated the peoples in favor 
of their leading politicians. The reputable and formerly independent Belgrade 
daily “Política” became the most servile mouth peace of Milosevic while the 
Belgrade based “Borba” ( the “Struggle”), the former official daily of the 
Communist Party, became far more independent and analytical newspaper than, for 
example, the “Vjesnik” in Zagreb that turned into an instrument of the Tudjman’s
11 Marcus Tunner, 1997, Croatia a Nation Forged in War, Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London, pp.223; See as well, Marco Prelec , “Franjo Tudjman’s Croatia and the Balkans”. In 
Crises in the Balkans, 1997, (ed. by) Danopulos, Messas, op. cit. pp. 75-89
12 Dyker, David A  "Nomenklatura Nationalsm, The Key to the New Eastern European Politics”?, 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol 41, no.l, 1995, pp. 55-69
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government.13 Still, particularly the veneries was the Belgrade press, because its 
journalists created a baggage of misinformation. They would impute statements to 
their opponents as being ’’anti-Yugoslav” or even more sinfully “anti-Serbian” 14 
That built up the great fear among the ordinary Serbs and was all the times crucial 
for Milosevic’s regime. During this time, there was a very important element, that 
is, the ruling parties in Serbia and in Montenegro never abandoned the hard core of 
monopoly over the most influential media and over key economic sectors and 
enterprises, besides the police and the army. 15
A serious blow that paralyzed the entire federal system was made by Serbia in 
May in 1991 when it refused to go alone, with what should have been a routine 
“proclamation” of Stipe Mesic, Croatia’s representative in the presidency, as its 
president for one year. Serbians refused his election judging him as “anti- 
Yugoslav”. This act left Yugoslavia without a head of state for the first time since 
1945. More important, it left the Yugoslav army without its commander-in-chief. 
That was followed by the blockade in other institutions. The work of the Federal 
Assembly was impeded, since its decisions required formal approval from the 
presidency before becoming law. It was the period that Yugoslavia entered the 
most serious phase that turned to be a final one towards the secession.16
13 Paul Mojzes, 1994, Yugoslavian Inferno op.cit. pp.54 ; Carl G. Hobsen, "War Crimes in the 
Balkans: Media Manipualation, Historical Amnesia, and Subjective Morality". In South Slav 
Conflict, 1996,( ed. by) Thomas, Friman, op. cit. 331-349
14 ibid, pp.45
15 Vladimir Goati,1995, Pecularities of the Serbian Political Scene in Challenges of 
Parlamentarism, The Case of Serbia in the Early Nineties, Institute of Social Science, Belgrade,
pp. 202
Christopher Cviic, "Yugoslavia; The Unmaking of a Federation" . In The Volatile Powder Keg, 
Balkan Security After the Cold War, 1994, (ed. by) F. Stephen Larrabee, Rand 1994. Pp.99
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The secession by the North was considered as an alternative, being convinced that 
Serbian nation would create system in which it would be worse off. 17 This 
political scene made it much easier for Kucan and his allies to preach Slovenian 
secession and win sympathy in the West for his cause.18 That is why the separatist 
movements in Slovenia and Croatia are to be regretted in many respects because 
they were primarily a response to the political climate created by Milosevic.
4.2 Attempts To Save the State: Negotiations about Yugoslavia's
Restructuring on the Eve of its Dissolution
Just prior to the blockade of the federal institutions, the north republics, Slovenia 
and Croatia, took the initiative by proposing the drafts for the transformation of the 
system of Yugoslavia. They made their efforts with other republics to achieve any 
agreement whatsoever. But it revealed that that the stances that they maintained, 
and the tendencies that other republics had for any restructuring of Yugoslavia, 
were too different. There again surfaced the planes of the Serbian policy that 
differed substantially from those nourished in the North. Failure of the negotiations 
led to a new phase, that is, that of dissolution through the civil war.
First initiatives for the future of Yugoslavia were taken by the top communist 
Slovenian and Croatian officials, Ribicic and Tomac. They came up with the idea 
of the so-called “asymmetrical federation” in 1989. The idea was initially 
elaborated in the Slovenian communist program that proclaimed the parallel 
existence of two systems in Yugoslavia: the developed and pluralistic "West” and 
the undemocratic and economically underdeveloped "East” under the Communist
17 Susan Woodward, 1995, Balkan Tragedy, Chaos and Dissolution op. cit. pp. 117
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monopoly.18 9 After the LCY fell apart and a month before the Mesic case blew up, 
Slovenia and Croatia proposed transformation of Yugoslavia into an alliance of 
sovereign states, presented in the form of a confederal contract, modeled on the 
organization and work of the European Community, with specific variations to 
meet Yugoslavia’s special needs. Thus, a common currency, foreign policy, and 
defense were to be retained within the new Federation/Confederation and the 
decisions would have to be reached univocally.20
With this draft Serbia and Montenegro did not agree. They rejected the proposal 
and indicated that they favored a more centralized Federation than that of 
Yugoslavia under the 1974 Constitution. The Serbs were once again championing 
the strong center. For them, any division into a several states separating parts of the 
Serbian people and put them within separate sovereign states was unacceptable. 
They emphasized that the confederation was not a state.21 At the impasse of the 
agreement, the two republics also declared their clear intentions to seek the re­
drawing of the Yugoslavia's internal borders with the aim of ensuring that all Serbs 
(and Montenegrins) live within one state. This was the first time that they 
promulgated their preparations for an aggressive war if other republics should 
pursue different goals.
Others repudiated the Serb/Montenegrin draft. In this unduly embroiled situation 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were the most threatened republics, politically 
and economically, by any Yugoslavia's fragmentation. They prompted with the
18 David Binder and Walter R. Roberts, "The Only good Serb is a .Mediterranean Quarterly, 
vol.9 , no.3, Summer 1998, pp. 34-36
19 Sekelj ,1993, Yugoslavia the Process of Disintegration, op. cit. pp.247
20 Christopher Cviic, The Volatile Powder Keg, 1994, (ed. by) F. Stephen Larrabee, o p . cit. pp. 99 
11 Review of International Affairs, 1991, no. 989 ,20  June Belgrade. This review gives the standpoint 
of all the various republican governments, on how the crisis should be settled.
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third model that sought to combine the features of the first two. Anyhow, it is not 
an accident that they were more interested than the other republics for finding the 
compromising solution in keeping together the Yugoslav Federation, with 
whatever the cost. To satisfy the claims of the North and those of Serbia and 
Montenegro, they developed a compromise proposal: a union at several different 
speeds, more "confederate" for Slovenia and Croatia and more binding for the 
others.22
It was obvious from the very beginning of the negotiations, that Slovenia and 
Croatia entered in a wavered way. One way involved their efforts to commence 
persuading the other republican leaders that they should work together in finding 
the models for the future confederal alliance, and the second way, parallel with the 
first one, was the permission of the authorities in Zagreb and Ljubljana to proceed 
with alert and with the further steps towards the complete political and military 
independence from the existing federal structure. 23 This strategy was anticipated 
as necessary, since the crucial problem was that it lacked the confidence in its 
advocate Milosevic, and the mortgage of Kosovo had been burdening it even 
further.24
From the outset, the negotiations showed the verge of the failure since the 
variations in the actors’ aims were in the deep discrepancy. Each republic 
conceded and justified their ambitions and the maximum of desired goals instead 
of negotiating a mutually acceptable compromise. Slovenia and Croatia unsatisfied 
with the course of the negotiations proceeded with their own intentions.25
22 Catherine Samary, 1995, Yugoslavia Dismebered, op. cit. pp.72
23 Lenard J. Cohen , 1995, Broken Bonds op. cit. pp. 198
24 Sekelj, op. cit. pp. 256
25 Tanjug, September, 1990, pp.3
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The matters came to a head on June 25, 1991, when first Slovenia and then, a few
hours later, Croatia declared the independence, with the justification that 
Yugoslavia was not in transforming process that would have been acceptable to 
them. Both based their decisions on referendums held on December 23, 1990, in 
Slovenia and on May 19, 1991 in Croatia. As much as Slovenia was with the 
ethnically homogeneous structure, 95% were declared for "yes" to the question of 
whether they wanted Slovenia to become a sovereign and independent state, while 
only 4% voted against.26 In Croatia, though, participated only 86% of the voters 
due to its ethnic heterogeneous composition. In it did not participate the rural part, 
where the Serbs formed the majority of population and which were in a state of 
rebellion against the government in Zagreb. Even that the referendum was 
formulated as the choice, not between the independence and Yugoslavia but 
between the federalism and the union of sovereign states .
When Slovenia proclaimed its independence, it started with the printing of the 
banknotes called "lipa" in October 1991, and opened its first diplomatic mission in 
Belgium. That it is why Milosevic by spring 1991 began to acknowledge that the 
secession of a nearly ethnically homogenous republic, such as Slovenia, with no 
substantial Serbian community, might become politically inevitable and even 
acceptable. But the situation differed in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 
used to live a large Serbian community and.the secession was not acceptable, 
unless major adjustments between Croatia and Serbia would be negotiated.26 In a 
comment to these declarations, Borislav Jovic, a Milosevic’s aide, stressed that 
Milosevic took over a task and the duty for action on issues that King Alexander
26 Cviic 1994, (ed by) Larrabee, op. cit. 99
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had done in 1928, that is, to keep the rest of Yugoslavia without Slovenia, 
including the Serbian populated areas of Croatia. 26 7 The view of Milosevic was 
backed from the army in order to defend its privileges and the federation rather 
than any project of Greater Serbia or Milosevic’s call. Since now, the Serbian elite 
and the General Staff of the JNA shared common interest in preserving Yugoslavia 
without any major restructuring. The JNA threatened Slovenia and Croatia that any 
attempt for unilateral secession from the federation was unacceptable and would be 
considered as an illegal act so that they were going to react by force.28
The JNA threat unduly embroiled the already tense situation. For this reason, the 
CIA warned on November that year that Yugoslav experiment had failed and that 
the country would violently fall apart within eight months although Washington’s 
policy still remained firmly committed to the unity of Yugoslav state.29 Even 
though the international community after the deadlock in the negotiations became 
alarmed that their failure might lead to a violent break up of Yugoslavia, it still 
maintained the stance in favor of the further unity and the status quo.30 This was a 
clear expression that the West would not respond to the aggression. This Western 
stance enabled the domination of the Serbs and Montenegrins in the Yugoslavian 
diplomatic corps and that helped them to turn it into a crucial campaign team in 
support of agression. The strategy that the Serbs were using was very simple, 
historical alliance with Russians, those of "traditional friends" (France), those
26 Lenard J Cohen, op. cit. pp.210
27 Tim Judah, op.cit. 23-25; Borisav Jovic, 1995, Poslednji Dani SFRJ, op. cit. pp.88
28 The much criticized speech of the minister of defense general Kadijevic, on the eve of Serbian 
elections in December 1990, was a call to support socialism, and thus Milosevic’s ex-communist 
Socialist party- rather than Milosevic himslf.; Veljko Kadijevic, 1993, Moje Vidjenje Raspada ( 
Beograd: Politika) pp. 107-109; James Gow, 1992,Legitimacy and the Military, Yugoslav Crisis, St. 
Martin Press, pp.l; Laura Silber & Alan Little, 1995, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, London, 
Television Books; Warren Zimmerman, the Last Ambassador. A Memoir of the Collapse of 
Yugoslavia. Forign Affairs, March,April 1995 p. 13
29 New York Times, November 28,1990, pp.7
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established through historical manipulation (demonetizations of Muslims as 
religious fanatics and Croats as Nazis), and the exploration of the Holocaust (Israel 
and Jewish community), as well as those founded on political interest opposed to 
disintegration (Great Britain).30 1
The end of the negotiations without results faded any hope for the future of the 
state. The constitutional crises caused constitutional blockade, process of the 
decentralization caused process of secession, and the referendums of independence 
assured in a formal and democratic way the validity of the declarations for the 
independence. These conditions would be a strong ground for the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in the days to come.32
4.3. The Wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
The 1991 was a year of independence both in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. 
Declarations of independence encompassed national self-determination. But still 
nobody, even those making the declarations, were clear enough as to what 
independence entailed. During that time three Baltic republics of the Soviet Union 
were also seeking independence. Soviet Union, by seeing the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia as a precedent for its own dissolution vigorously opposed the secession 
of Slovenia and Croatia. This was the reason why from the outset the United States 
favored the status quo in Yugoslavia fearing that the break up of the Soviet Union
30 David Reisman, Western Responses to the Current Balkan War.In This Time We Knew, 1996, 
(ed. by), Cushman ,Mestrovic,op.cit. pp. 350-358
31 Slaven Letica, The Genesis of the Current Balkan War. In Genocide After Emotion, The 
Postemotional Balkan War, 1996, (ed. by) Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Routledge, pp. 91-112
32 Lidija R. Basta, Evropa I Raspad Yugoslavie, ( Europe and The Dissolution of Yugoslavia), 1995 
(ed . by) Radmila Nakarada, op. cit. pp. 135
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would destabilize the entire region of Europe.33 One of the most important signals 
in favor of the Federation that openly directed the track towards the march of war 
was declaration of James Baker, the US State Secretary, made on June 22, 1991, 
emphasizing that the United States favored Yugoslav unity and that it would not 
recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. 34 At the same time, it 
coincided as well with the declaration of NATO’s commander, general John 
Galvin, who told to the one of the Belgrade’s daily newspapers that NATO would 
not act in the zones that are not considered as its defense perimeter, stressing that 
Yugoslavia is one of those zones and therefore it would not intervene in a 
Yugoslav civil war.35 The Serbs used all these signals to foster their already made 
planes that were sealed in the 1986 Memorandum and their prominent leader, 
Slobodan Milosevic, directed the plans’ execution.
Analyzing the facts for finding the causes of the wars, first in Slovenia and Croatia 
and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina some authors such as Susan Woodward find them 
in the Slovene leadership that "rather on seeking a coalition within the country, 
they refused to participate in federal institutions and threatened to exist if others 
did not agree to their position” 36 Others, like Zimmerman the causes of the war 
found in the policy led by the two actors, Milosevic, considering him as a 
"opportunist driven by power", and Tudjman, considering him as a nationalist with 
his policy of "separatist nationalism" after the elections. These two politicians have
33 Alan Fogelquist, 1993, Handbook of Facts on the Break - Up of Yugoslavia, International Policy 
and the War in Bosnia -  Hercegovina, © Alan F. Fogelquist, pp. 12-13; Philip J. Cohen, "Ending 
the War and Securing the Peace in Former Yugoslavia". In Genocide After Emotion , 1996, (ed. by) 
Mestrovic op. cit. pp. 31-50
34 Washington Post, 22 June 1991; The fact is that Lawrence Eagelburger ( Deputy-Secretary of 
State and Brent Scowcoat ( National Security adviser), seems that had impact, introducing 
emotional commitment to the Yugoslav cause, which blinded them to the real aims of Milosevic; 
See,David Gompert," How To Defeat Serbia", Foreign Affairs, July August 1994, vol.73, no.4, cit. 
pp.33
35 Tanjug ( Junel, 1991), in FBIS, Daily Report ( Eastern Europe), June3,1991, p.43
36 Woodward op. cit. pp.l 17
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been regarded by others as well with the direct impact on break-up of the nation 
and the civil war.37 Yet, as we have seen above the root causes of the war lie in a 
psychologically and logistically well-prepared program for aggression by the 
Serbian regime in Belgrade ,38 It had been designed for building the centuries old 
dream of Greater Serbia. The citation of Slavenka Drakulic that the “war is not 
difficult to understand at all since there existed a Serbian political elite to 
determine and start a war. It controlled the army, media and it head four years of 
systematic nationalist propaganda behind it”.39 It is the fact that this quotation 
utterly fits to the situation for commencing the war, and appropriate momentum 
was found at the time when international community favored the federation 
without seeing the conspicuous aggressive policy of Milosevic that did not let the 
room for any concessions. The United States and the West did not see these 
occurred events in a complete and real shape but in a reduced and simplistic 
manner as a fight between the "competing gangs" .40
Using this chance, the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) started the first action on 
June 25,1991. They bombed the Slovenian airport at Brnik and Maribor and tried 
to seize control of Slovenia's borders. These actions the JNA justified as if in 
pursuit of its constitutional obligation to protect the territorial unity and integrity of 
Yugoslavia, even though they were without mandate of the Army’s commander-in- 
chief, the presidency, that was paralyzed by the non election of Stipe Mesic as its
37 Warren Zimmerman, 1997, Origins of a Catastrophe .(published by Besa-Tirana) op.cit., see 
Milosevic, Tudjman
38 Roy Gutman, 1993, A Witness to Genocide, The 1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Gompert,” How 
To Defeat Serbia", Foreign Affairs, July August 1994, vol.73, no.4, cit. pp.33
38 Roy Gutman, 1993, A Witness to Genocide, The 1993 Pulitzer Prize Winning Dispatches on the 
*’ Ethnic Cleansing *’ of Bosnia, Macmillan Publishin Company, pp.15
39 Slaven Letica," The West Side Story of the Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Wars in Slovenia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia- Herzegovina". In This Time We Knew, 1996, (ed. by) Cushman, Mestrovic, pp. 
177
40 Dejvid Owen, Balkanska Odiseja, Radio B92, Beograd, pp.27
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head in the May of that year.41 But, the war in Slovenia surprised unpleasantly the 
JNA. Defeat of the JNA troops was partly a consequence of a miscalculation about 
Slovenia's capacity to fight, lack of moral among the JNA troops and a reckless 
lack of preparation on the part of the Yugoslav high command. War in Slovenia 
ended with the so called Brioni Declaration.42 It was not an EC triumph, as it was 
believed, that coordinated the Troika’s foreign-ministers mission to Yugoslavia. It 
so occurred because the JNA decided unilaterally to pull out all of its troops and 
equipment within three months. 43 The reason behind was that Milosevic wanted a 
strong army to provide political competition about the future state. For that 
Milosevic's message was: "Let them go" (as general Kadijevic calls in his 
memoirs). 44As long as the EC’s involvement did not have the enforcement 
capability, and the intervention would be improbable, the JNA decided to fight for 
the borders of a "new Yugoslavia". In this context, its priority was to mount a 
counter-offensive which would confront the destroyers of the old Yugoslavia. 45 
The next step would be Croatia.
The political situation in Croatia was very vulnerable after the elections, and the 
Tudjman’s party, the HDZ, won. The key role was played by dr. Jovan Rashkovic, 
renown specialist for group therapy. He started his duty with priming the masses 
for insurrection and aggression, by proposing changes in the republic's 
constitution, that was incentive for violent confrontations, particularly in and
41 Eduard R. Ricciuti, 1993, War in Yugoslavia, The Break-up of a Nation, Blackbirch Graphichs 
Inc, pp. 26-27
42 Joint Declaration of the EC Troika and the Parties Directly Concerned with the Yugoslav Crisis, 
the so called Brioni Accord. Brioni- Croatia, 7July 1991. The text in Snezana Trifunovska, 1994, 
Yugoslavia Through Documents, From its Creation to its Dissolution. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, pp. 311-315
43 Stanoje Jovanovic, 1991,The Truth About the Armed Struggle in Slovenia, Belgrade, Narodna 
Armija, pp. 23-24
44 Veljko, Kadijevic, 1993,Moje Vidjenje Raspada, op.cit. pp. 131
45 ibid, pp. 131
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around the Rnin area populated with the majority Serb population.46 Being aware 
of the provocation, Tudjman was anxious not to give a Belgrade a pretext for 
intervention. He was ready even to offer parts of Croatia, such as Vukovar, in 
exchange for a peaceful settlement, but since the "imaginary enemies" were the 
essence of Milosevic rule, he had no desire to end the conflict with Croatia. With 
the backing of the JNA as well with the backing of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
that blessed the war as a "holy war" through publishing the articles on their 
contribution to the development of the culture of the Osijek and the articles on 
sufferings of the Serbs in Ustase concentration camp at Jasenovac, the preparations 
for another aggressive war got under way.47 And in July of that year the war 
escalated dramatically (40.000 voluntaries joined the Serbian Guard and were 
organized under the auspices of the Serbian Renaissance Movement).
Only when the war broke out in Croatia, the attitude towards the federalism in 
former Yugoslavia changed. This was the reason that Lord Carrington, the Former 
British foreign secretary, was asked by the European Community to chair a peace 
conference in the Hague. After a long meeting on 16 December, the European 
Council of EC Foreign Ministers, discussed the question of recognition of the 
Yugoslav republics wishing to be recognized as independent. 48 In fact, after the
46 Daniel N. Nelson, 1992, Balkan Imbroglio, Politics and Security in Southeastern 
Europe, Westview Press pp.2
47 For a brilliant account of the role of the Serbian church in the national 
awakening of Serbs, see the work of Ivo Banac, Nationalism in Serbia. In Balkans, 
A Mirror of the New International Order, 1995, (ed. by) Gunay Goksay& Ozdan Kemali 
Saybasili, Marmara University
48 James Gow, 1997,Triumph of the Lack of Will, Hurst & Company, pp.63; (EC Declaration 
Concerning the Conditions for Recognition of New States), adopted at the Extraordinary EPC 
Minesterial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991,UN DOC.S/ 23293, Annex I, Trifunovska, op. 
cit. pp. 431-432. Within this context, EC made public its so-called ‘’Guidelines on Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” . The recognition could be granted in the 
framework of a general settlement and have the following components: a. A loose association or 
alliance of sovereign or independent republics; b. adequate arrangement to be made 
for the protection of minorities, including human rights guarantees and possibly 
Special Status for certain areas, c. no unilateral changes in borders... UN DOC. S/ 23169, Annex
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deal in Slovenia, Germany proposed the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, 
considering that it would be a deterrent act against further army attacks in Croatia. 
Yet, it was not accepted by its EC partners. 49 50
Relative gains of a key states within EU: France, Britain and Germany, could be 
seen from the inception of the conflict in former Yugoslavia. Germany advocating 
the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and two others opposing them by using 
their privileges in the UN Security Council in an attempt to block Germany for 
they feared the establishment or re-establishment of a German block in Central 
Europe.30 German pressure for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia came to 
peak in mid December just prior to the Masstricht Summit of EC heads of state 
which debated the future course of European monetary and political integration. 
Germany succeeded in persuading its partners, and the EC recognized Croatia and 
Slovenia on 15 January 1992 while Bosnia-Herzegovina was asked to have a 
referendum as a precondition for the recognition.
The EC lacked the military clout and could never be more than talking meeting 51 
It could not intervene in the conflict, even though at the outset of the war in 
Slovenia, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poss, who headed the initial 
Troika to Yugoslavia, was bold enough to- declare that “this is the hour of
II. ( Adopted at the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 16,1991). 
Hague Peace Conference had been replaced by the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICFY); see as well Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", American Journal of International Law, vol. 86, no. 3, July, pp. 
569-607; Bojko Bucar,"Emerging New Criteria for the Recognition of States”, Journal of 
International Relations, Ljubljana 4, 1-4, 1997, pp. 73-83
49 Cviic, (ed.by) Larrabee, op. cit. pp. 102
50 Joanne Wright, "European Security-Post Bosnia", European Security, vol.6, no.2, Summer 1997, 
ppl-17; Peter Viggo Jakobsen," Myth-Making and Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia 
and Slovenia". European Security, vol.4, no.3 Autumn 1995,pp.400-417
51 Leo Tindemans, 1996, Unfinished Peace, Report of the International Commission on the 
Balkans, (Berlin: Aspen Institute: Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment), pp.56
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Europe".52 That was clear enough to show that the EU alone could not handle the 
crises despite the WEU being designated as the EU’s military instrument.53
Major reason to end the war in Croatia was not any international reaction. Rather, 
the stalemate of November was the main factor, with neither side in a position to 
make a significant progress. In a way, the recognition of Croatia appeared to have 
halted the war in Croatia since Milosevic decided to make a deal and called the 
United Nations to prepare a peace treaty. The UN agreement was signed in 1992.
If one looks closer to the strategy of the war, being further developed during the 
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there could conclude that it was based on a 
combination of Soviet and Nazi doctrines (Soviet- encirclement and destruction’s 
of towns and civil population, and the later including the so-called ethnic 
cleansing, concentration camps, and outright genocide.54 This strategy was used as 
the means of securing the territorial gains. For that reason the Serbs from the 
beginning of the war decided to shift the Serb population of Western Slavonia to 
Eastern Slavonia where the Croat and and Hungarian majority had been ethnically 
cleansed. The objectives of the two belligerent parties were different. In the case of 
Croats, they fought for setting up a new state and they never sought to carry the 
fight beyond Croatia's border, despite the fact that JNA fighters were firing directly 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia proper.55 The Serbian 
objectives, though, were clear enough: the war of aggression with the aim of 
enlarging its state.
52 Benett, op. cit. pp.160
53 Joanne Wright op.cit. pp5
54 Slaven Letica, Genocide after Emotion, 1996, (ed. by) Mestrovic op.cit. 91-112
55 Cviic, Remaking the Balkans, op.cit. pp. 71
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The same strategy would follow the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that was among 
the bloodiest after the WW II. For a while, it seemed as if the call of the 
international community "never again” would.be obeyed. But, it did not happen. 
The Bosnia-Herzegovina tragedy marks the shame of humanity, especially of 
Europe.
The first clear military actions for the new borders would be seen in Bosnja- 
Herzegovina. They were undertaken at the same time as the war in Croatia was 
being intensified. Earlier, before the war broke out, the JNA had began a series of 
maneuvers across Bosnia-Herzegovina that enabled it to mobilize the Serbs from 
Bosnia to fight against its own state. To forestall the Serbian aggression, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was recognized as an independent republic by the international 
community on 6 April 1992.56
The fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina issue was very sensitive one led Lord Carrington 
on 6 January 1992 to come up with a plan for opening of the separate set of talks 
for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina within the framework of the EC Conference. 
The talks began in Lisbon on 21-22 February 1992. The idea proposed by the hosts 
of the Conference, Cutiliero and Carrington, was based on a three "constituent 
units" within Bosnia. The plan confirmed the principle of ethnically territorial units 
that proved to be a cardinal mistake of the international Community for as long as 
it did not take firm action through a political decision to recognize Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in January. Thus, it proved to be the sirens for a Serbian campaign 
against the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.57
56 James Gow, 1997, The Triumph of the Lack of W ill, op. cit. pp.80-84
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Izetbegovic, president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, being aware of the situation that 
might occur accepted the conditions as set out in the Lisbon Conference. Others 
from the Muslim side of the delegation pressed him to abandon the decision 
because of implications based on ethnic division. Furthermore, they still believed 
that U.S. aid would be on a way as soon as the Serbian aggression will start. 57 8 This 
was an impressible calculation on the Muslim side because U.S. abandoned 
Yugoslav unity, but still supported the idea of mediation and conflict resolution 
through the EC and OSCE as the most viable solution. 59 These mechanisms had 
no enforcement capacity and this proved fatal for the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This U.S. reluctance in being involved in the conflict had very simple explanation. 
The United States did not have any geo-strategic interest. Besides, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina did not pose any threat to the international peace and security. This 
American stance was confirmed in July 1992 when the Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney referred to the conflict as an “internal civil war” rather than as a 
“cross border operation” or a “threat to international order”.60 British government 
as well supported the stance, considering that conflict involves no vital interests 
and would not be justified the use of western troops in the conflict.
Muslims still believed that the West or more precisely U.S. will start aiding them. 
It was this reason that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had not been formed until 
May 1992 and state of war was declared only in June 1992. By that time the Serb 
forces had already overrun much of the Republic. The Bosnian side felt betrayed 
and abandoned by the international community which had recognized Bosnia-
57 ibid. pp. 84
58 Lenard J. Cohen, 1993, Broken Bonds,op.cit.243
59 Fisher, M. "Germany’s Role Stirs Some Concern in U.S", The Washington Post, 23 January
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Herzegovina but refused to defend its territorial integrity. To make the situation 
harder for the Muslims, an arms embargo had been approved against all Yugoslavs 
while the war in Croatia was still in progress.60 1 This resolution caused difficulties 
for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s improvement of its fight capacity while for the Serbs it 
did not have any negative impact since it only frizzed the bulk of military 
superiority that they already had. The imbalance that existed in the arms helped the 
“ethnic cleansing” campaign of the Serbs. The ethnic cleansing strategy was 
needed in order to link up and expand the territories the Serbs controlled in 
Western and Eastern Bosnia and, consequently, create a contiguous Serbian 
republic between Croatian Krajina and Serbia proper. All, this was done by 
eliminating non-Serb civilians.
The international community was alarmed by the actions of the Serbs and their 
policy of “ethnic cleansing”. Still, the reaction to the conflict was in stalemate. The 
justification for the inaction was reduced in very simple words: ethnic conflict in 
Yugoslavia was explained by four parameters, that is, ethnicity, nationalism and 
conflict summarized as barbarism, collectivism, spontaneity and isolationism.62 For 
the policy of U.S. this meant Vietnam, in the case of Great Britain another 
Northern Ireland, for the French - Algeria, Afghanistan for the Russians and
60 Reneo Lukic and Alen Lynch, "U.S Policy Towards Yugoslavia: from Differentation to 
Disintegration'Mn South Slav Conflict ,1996, (ed.by) Thomas, Friman
61 Resolution 713 (1991), adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th meeting,25 September 
1991. The text in Snezana Trifunovska, Yugoslavia Through Documents, op. cit. pp.349-50. For the 
complete chronology and history of the arms embargo and its strategic aims, see more in Norman 
Cigar, 1995, The Rights to Defense. Thoughts on the Bosnian Arms Embargo. Institute for European 
Defense and Strategic Studies.
62 Radmila Nakarada& Obrad Racic,1998, Raspad Jugoslavie, Izazov Evropskoj Bezbednostif 
Dissolution o f Yugoslavia, Challenge for the European Security) Institut Za Evropske Studije, 
PP 21
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another Lebanon for all.63 These were all-powerful reasons to avoid the 
entanglement to the conflict.
First initiatives for ending the conflict were taken in late august 1992. But, the then 
reached agreement was never implemented. Another initiative was taken in late 
October 1992, known as Vance-Owen plan and undertaken within the framework 
of EC's International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. The presented plan 
awarded the Serbs with the territories that they had in control and was 
comprehended as a means to appease the Serbs for the end of the fighting. This 
plan not that only failed to end the fighting, but as a result had a destruction of the 
Croat-Muslim alliance and the creation of a three-parties conflict.64 From the 
beginning the plan was not backed by the US, considered as being unfair to the 
Muslims side, although the conflict was redefined after the Clinton took presidency 
post. The tragic consequence that stemmed from this redefinition was that it 
considered the conflict as having both elements, those of “civil war” and “the war 
of aggression”. Consequently, the United States were incapable to stop it 
unilaterally.65
In line with the above, the diplomatic improvements to end the fighting have not 
been in a way. The Clinton promises during his elections, that defeated the 
republicans with their president Bush, to take a tough policy to end the fighting in
63 Bush compared Bosnia to Lebanon, not to Gulf War. Barton, Gellman and Ann Devroy, "U.S 
Weights for Options on Yugoslavia", Washington Post, 11 June 1992,p. 1 ; Eric Schmit, ” Reluctant 
To Use Force, U.S. Is Assessing Sanctions," New York Times" 1 June 1992,p.8
64 Elaine Scolino," Vance Owen , Bosnia Move is Surprise for Washington," New York Times",31 
January 1993,p.l0; see for more on James Gow,1997, Cohen, Broken Bonds, Marko Prelec, "A 
House Built on Sand, The Western Response to the War in Bosnia". In Why Bosnia? Writings on 
Balkan War, 1993, (ed. by) Rabia Alia & Lawrence Lifschults, The Pamphleteer's Press,Inc. pp. 
191-232
65 Anthony Lewis,” More than Bosnia", New York Times, 26 april 1992; Anthony Lewis, " The 
New World Order, New York Times 17 May 1992, p.21
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Bosnia faded away. During the first year of his incumbency, the policy hardly 
yielded any tangible result. The only step further had been the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993). 66 Although the 
American policy was based on checking Serbian aggression, the efforts of 
Europeans to end the fighting were directed towards awarding the Serbs. They 
thought that it was the only way to appease the Serbs. This logic was again 
approved in Owen-Stoltenberg plan that was a continuation of the previous plan of 
Vance-Owen. Furthermore, the latter gave to the Serbs more explicit carve-up of 
Bosnia- Herzegovina than it was envisaged under the Vance-Owen plan67
First real steps from the international community with the aim of stopping the war 
were taken on 2 April 1994 when NATO agreed to mount the first real world 
operation, pursuing the resolution 816 of the Security Council of 31 March 1993. 
But, again without final result. Even the fall of Srebrenica in circumstances of 
unimaginable savagery, would not convince the international community to 
seriously try ending the fighting68. The only diplomatic breakthrough was 
achieved on 25 March !994, when the Croatian- Bosnian Accord was brokered in 
secret by US diplomats who promised to the parties the financial aid for the 
reconstruction. The US diplomats perceived this as the only way to balance 
Bosnian Serbs despite the previous Bosnian-Croat heavy fighting.
This alliance brought a major effect in changes in the battlefield in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and changed the course of the war towards reaching a settlement that
66 David Binder and Walter R. Roberts, Meditarrean Quarterly op. cit. pp. 34
67 The United Nations and the Situation in Former Yugoslavia,( New York: UN Department for 
Public Information pp. 30-3
68 By 23 July, one way or another, the Muslim population of the Srbrenica area had been" virtually 
eliminated", in circumstances of "unimaginable savagery".
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eventually led to the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 . The Dayton Peace 
Agreement is hardly perfectly designed to fulfill the ambitions of all three parties. 
Even Holbrooke himself agreed that the plan was not a perfect one, but initially it 
stopped the fighting.69
The core logic of Dayton rests with a military balance of power and the 
codification of the Serbian aggression.70 It was negotiated to support a dubious 
objective: the objective of nation, where no common sense of national community 
existed, and the appeasement of the Serbian obsession with self-rule via the 
ratification of the "República Srpska", the Bosnian Serb fiefdom, declared shortly 
after Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia in March 1992.
involvement see: Jeremy Drucker, “Srebrenica's Ghosts, Legacy of the Massacre in a Dutch 
Soldiers Photos”, Transition,vol.5, no.8 August 1998, pp. 34-35
69 Warren Bass, "The Triage of Dayton", Foreign Affairs vol.77, no.5 September, October 
1998,pp.95-108; Patrick Moore," Revealing Dayton's Fatal Flaws". Transition vol.2 no.4, 12 July 
1996 p.5; James A. Schear, "Bosnia's Post- Dayton Traummas". Foreign Policy no. 104 fall 1996 
pp. 87-102; Pierre Jackuet, "Dayton,IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia", Survival vol.38 no.4 
Winter 1996-97,pp.45-66
70 Charles G. Boyd, "Making Bosnia Work" Foreign Affairs vol. 77,no.l, January, 
February1988,pp. 42-55. For the perspectives of "Post Dayton Bosnia" see David Chandler, 
"Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies".In Democratization, 
vol.5,no.4, Winter 1998,pp.78-102 pub.by Frank Class, London
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4.4. Kosovo and the FRY: Further Disintegration!?
After the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro claimed that 
they were entitled to continue former Yugoslavia’s international legal personality. 
The claim has so far been refuted by the international community. They have to 
meet the conditions from the EC Guidelines set up within the framework of 
“Yugoslavia Conference” hosted by Lord Carrington in 1991.71
With the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, the case of Kosova was regarded as the 
most dangerous flashpoint in the Balkans. For this reason as early as 1993 George 
Bush stressed that Milosevic had been warned not to extend the conflict beyond 
the "read line". That line was stretched in the region of Kosovo72. The reason 
behind this warning was that the conflict in Kosovo would destabilize Albania and 
two republics of former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Macedonia 
comprises 33% of Albanian minority that are not satisfied with their status within 
the state as does Montenegro with its small minority of Albanian origin. 
Furthermore, the conflict in Kosova has directly an impact in the balance of power 
in the triangle between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey.73
During the time that Milosevic waged wars in other republics of former 
Yugoslavia, for fulfilling his ambitions and desires from the Greater Serbia
71 Refering to Opinion No.l of 9 November 1991, the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
( Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted. For the full text see 
Trifunovska.pp. 415-418; 474; 634-640; Alain Pellet, Th Opinions of the Badinter Committee: A 
Second Breath for the Self- Determination of Peoples. European Journal of International Law, 
vol.3 no.l, 1992
73 Hasan Unal, Courses on "Politics and History in the Balkans", at the Bilkent University, Ankara, 
February-May 1998
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Project, Kosova with the abolition of the 1974, has remained the part of Serbia, and 
was the most persecuted place in Europe. 74 Due to the policy of the moderate 
Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovar Albanians built a parallel life since 
1991. The province managed to avoid the war well until 1998. This delicate 
balance was severely upset, when on 28 February 1998, the Serbian authorities 
launched the first major large-scale offensive against the ethnic Albanian 
population, which by mid July had left some 400 dead and forced tens of thousands 
more to flee their homes and villages.75
This conflict was another one triggered by Milosevic, in a long-run series for 
realization of tasks and duties designated in the lots of early projects and that had 
one aim: to “ethnically cleanse” the province and then colonize it with the Serb
population76.
The Wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, were waged with the pretext that all the 
Serbs should live within one state, being based on the demographic argument that 
majority population around the Knin were the Serbs, while ignoring historical and 
political factors which clearly show that there has never been a Serbian state in that 
area. But when, this argument goes in the favor of other case, as in Kosova were 
90% of the population are the Albanians, or in Vojvodina and Sandjak, where the 
demographic argument was overwhelmingly to the advantage of the non-Serbian 
population, its force was simply ignored and "political arguments" were brought to
74 Helsinki Watch, International Helsinki Federation, Yugoslavia: Crisis in Kosovo, March 1990.
75 Tihomir Loza, Special Report Kosovo Albanians: Closing the Ranks, A Journey What Would be 
the Next Balkan War Zone, (with dispatches from Pristina and Belgrade), Transitions vol.5 no.5, 
May 1998
76 Rexhep Qosja," The Albanian National Question in the Serb Political Programs During 1937- 
1944". ‘ The International Journal of Albanian Studies’ Vol. I Issue 1 Fall 1997
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the fore.77 This argument is valid for Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, in which Serbs 
were never in the majority, and in that case demographic argument has no 
strenghth. Even in the legal aspect, there has never been a Serbian state.78
Even though the Serbs claim that Kosova is the Serbian part; there are no legal 
bases for such a claim. Instead of the arguments their demands were based on a 
web of heroic folklore, myth and legend. 79 Kosova/o is comprised with 90% of 
Albanians, and in legal aspects, with the Constitution of 1974, it gained the 
elements of the classic state by enjoying virtually all the prerogatives of a 
republic, having its own constitution, government, courts and national bank, and an 
equal voice within the collective presidency. 80 When Serbia in 1989 essentially 
abolished Kosova's autonomy, there started the serious crises that covered the 
political scene of Yugoslavia, and this case hastened the collapse of Yugoslavia. 
This was only one step to go on with further action, that of aggressive wars, that 
revealed what the Serbs were hunting for. In the case of Croatia, the Serbs aimed at 
controlling the particularly fertile and oil-rich fields in Baranja and Eastern 
Slavonia, as well the seaside resources of the Adriatic coast. 81In Bosnia- 
Herzegovina the-retention of a key strategic area and also the location of the bulk 
of former Yugoslavia's defense industry was aimed at by the Serbs,82 a case 
repeated in Kosovo as well by trying to retain the territory’s richest areas in mineral 
resources, vital to Serbia’s economy.83 For that reason the only viable solution for
77 Ferid Muhic, Macedonia, and Island on the Balkan'Mainland. In Yugoslavia and After, 1996, 
(ed.by) Dyker Vejvoda, pp.240
78 ¡bid.pp.240
79 Sabrinap. Ramet, Nationalism and the " Idiocy" of the Countryside: The Case of Serbia. Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, no. 1/96 pp.76-78; William Plaff, An Invitation to War, Forign Affairs, 
vol.72,no.3 , Summer 1993 pp.77-110
80 1974 Constitution, art.4
81 Slaven Letica, Genocide After Emotion,op.cit.pp.91-112
82 Christopher Cviic, The Volatile Powder k'eg.op.cit.pp.107
83 Alexis Heraclides, "The Kosovo Conflict and Its resolution: In Pursuit of Ariadne's Thread", 
Security Dialogue, vo.28, no.3 September 1997, pp.317-333
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the Serbs in Kosova case was the partition of the province, in demanding that the
wealthiest part to remain within Serbia. This scenario was discarded by the 
Western leaders after NATO bombing against the FRY started on March 1999.
After the war in Bosnia and the Dayton Agreement, the situation in Kosova/o will 
change the course of events and the situation will be ramified in different 
directions. Rugova with his leading peace policy known as "Albanian Gandhi" won
Q A
an overwhelming support in the 1998 presidential elections of Kosova. He was 
able to direct the country through some of its hardest times. Situation in Kosova/o, 
the poorest region of the former Yugoslavia, had always been difficult, even during 
second Yugoslavia As far back as 1977, one of Tito’s closest aides, Edvard 
Kardelj, had warned that: "if the party fails to adopt a resolute policy that would 
narrow the political gap and tranquilize interethnic tensions in the province, 
Kosova/o would explode in violence".84 5
After the Kosova/o province fell under full control of the Milosevic regime in 
1989, the first undertaken measures were dismissal of the Albanians from their 
schools considering them as "birth place of the Albanian nationalism", the same 
steps as during the Kingdom time.86 They continued with other measures in 
expulsion of tens of thousands Albanians from their jobs in state owned 
enterprises, shut down the Prishtina Television, passed new laws, among them was 
the law that it made a crime for the Albanians to buy or sell property without
84 24 May 1992, elections for the presidency took p lace.'
85 Rilindja, November 8, 1975
86 Petrit Imami, www. danasco.yu. Fejton Srbi I Albanci Kroz Vekove,September 1988
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special permission of the authorities, while arbitrary arrest and police violence
• 87directed towards the Albanians become routine practice.
Rugova with his Gandhian-type policy, encouraged the parallel life, and created a 
society of Albanian-run political, cultural, educational, health and media structures. 
In this way he managed to create a "Shadow State", with the aim of gaining the 
independence for Kosova. His rule was based on two principles. The first one was 
to avoid the open conflicts with the Serb authorities, and the second one was based 
on the belief that this way is the best one for gradually gaining support of the 
international community for Kosova’s independence, the only aim for the Kosovar 
Albanians expressed in the referendum of 1991.87 8
To this demand of Albanians the international community showed its reluctance in 
supporting the independence of Kosova, with the justification that it will not stand 
for the secessions and a redrawing of international borders.89 This biased way was 
showed earlier when the government of the Kosovar Albanians applied for the 
international recognition as foreseen by the Badinter Commission that stressed that 
"Yugoslavia has ceased to exist". The demand was rejected and the response of 
the Commission was that the provinces could not achieve independence in the 
same process as republics because they were not endowed with sovereignty.90
87 Helsinki Watch, Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992, New York: Human Rights Watch
1992; Fabian Schmidt, Kosovo, The Time Bomb That Has Not Gone Off. In RFE/RL Research 
Report, vol.2,no.39,l October 1993,pp.21-29; Council for the Defence of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in Kosova, http :// albanian.
Com/kmdljn/showdoc.cgi?/file=english(mujore)10.en.htm.
88 On 19 October 1991, the Republic of Kosova/o was proclaimed as an independent and a 
sovereign state, and on 23 October, a provisional coalition government under the leadership of LDK 
was formed with the urologist Bujar Bukoshi as Prime Minister.
89 Benjamin Neuberger," National Self-Determination, Dilemas of a Concept", Nations and 
Nationalism vol.l, 1 march 1995
90 The Kosovo Albanian leadership's argumented that representation on the collective federal 
Presidency made Kosova/o a sovereign federating unit. This argument as ignored by the Badinter 
Commision and by the EC; Letter by the Government of the Republic of Kosova/o, to' the
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When the Dayton Agreement was reached, It did not embrace the Kosova/o issue. 
It was mentioned only once in the Final Treaty and that in connection with the 
preconditions for lifting the remaining sanctions against the FRY, or, the so-called 
"Outer Wall of Sanctions". 91The reason that Albanians were not included in the 
Agreement were as follows: first, it was felt that there was simply to much to 
negotiate already with Milosevic, since the obstacle was cooperation with the 
Tribunal Hague, on handing over to it the war criminals indicted for. Second, no 
one wanted to alienate Milosevic as the "peace maker" who had forced the Bosnian 
Serbs to accept the compromises, and his cooperation was needed for successful 
implementation of the Dayton Agreement. And, a third reason was that there was 
an absence of war, and that there was no urgent need to deal with the question. 92
The policy led by Ibrahim Rugova contributed substantially to the 
internationalization of the problem, and for that gained a solid support from most 
Western Governments. He was received officially by most of them, including the 
president of the United States. 93But still this policy hardly yielded any concrete, 
tangible results.
The unresolved issue of Kosova induced more radical groups to think that 
situation is not going to be solved through the peaceful policy and that only
Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels,21 December 1991. In The Truth of 
Kosova, 1993, (ed. by) Academy of the Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History 
.Tirana, Encyclopedia Publishing House, pp. 329; see for more James Gow,1997, how Kosovars 
should better argued their position pp.76, footnote no.26.'
91 Janusz Bugajski, Close to the Edge in Kosovo, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1998, 
vol.21,no.3, pp. 19-21; Shkelzen Maliqi, "Beyond Drenica, Crisis of Kosova", Transitions, 
vol.5,no.4, April 1998; Fabian Schmidt, "Teaching the Wrong Lesson in Kosovo". In Transition , 
vol.2,no.l4, 12 July 1996, pp.37-39. Original text, TJN.DOC.S/1995/999/1995.
92 Richard Kaplan," International Diplomacy and The Crises in Kosovo", International Affairs, 
vol.74, no.4 October 1998,pp.745-761
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violence could succeed in wining international recognition. Endless discussions of 
"preventive diplomacy" and "early warnings mechanisms" did not solve anything. 
Even the promised International Conference for Kosovo, after the Dayton 
Agreement, made by Richard Holbrooke and President Clinton did not take 
place.93 4 As the Serbian repression in Kosovo grew and the international 
Community remained insensitive to Albanian Kosovar complaints, frustration of 
the Albanians also grew. This was the psychological basis for the emergence of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army. The KLA. (In Albanian : U£K) was the fuse that led to 
the explosion, especially among the rural areas .95 In reaction to the UCK , the Serb 
authorities found a legitimate pretext for brutally unlawful measures. It was used 
by Milosevic to provoke widespread Albanian uprising and than to go on with the 
war and justify the strategy of ethnic cleansing. 96
This danger of expanded war has prompted Western leaders to move more quickly 
against Milosevic than they did in 1991. The U.S Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright had already warned that : " We are not going to stand by and watch the 
Serbian authorities to do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing 
in Bosnia " .97 Reactions of the Great Powers "Contact Group" has limited such 
Serbian ambitions and pushed Belgrade toward negotiations.
Negotiations were held in Rambolliet, France, during the February of 1999. The 
Albanian Kosovar Delegation signed the Rambolliet Plan prepared by the "Contact 
Group" on Yugoslavia. The Plan provided for substantial autonomy and self-
93 Sami Repishti, Illyria, Newspaper, 4/5/1999
94 Alice Mead, Illyria Newspaper, 4/5/1999
95 Sasa Zajovic, "Kosovo, Nightmare of the Serbian Dream". In, Peace News, March 1997,pp.ll- 
14; Schmidt Fabian," Protest in Serbia Raise Hopes of reconciliation in Kosovo". In Transition, 
vol.3, n o .4 ,7 March 1997, pp.16-18
96 Maliqi, Transition, vol.5. no.5, April 1998
105
government for the people of Kosova over a transitional period of three years. 
Although this arrangement fell short of what Albanians in Kosova demand and 
deserve, the Albanian Delegation decided to sign it.97 8 The Serb part did not sign, 
even though it was seriously threatened that they would face the NATO 
intervention. Again the international community was convinced that Milosevic 
knows only the language of the force. And campaign began on 24 March 1999. In 
response to the NATO intervention, the Serbs again killed the innocent civilians, 
slaughtered the babies, and massacred scores of people.
Now the question is: would the Kosovar Albanians remain within the claims 
foreseen by the Rambolliet Plan, being a part of the FRY, or would they push for 
outright independence ?
The US and the West still staunchly back the stance that to the independence 
should not be granted to the Kosovar Albanians because that allegedly would 
create the precedent for the future and would encourage the forces of separation 
over those of integration. The fragile peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be 
shattered is emphasized in support of the above argument denying the 
independence for Kosova.99 This is the prevailing stance in the West, at least for 
the time being.
But there are distinctions to be made between the two cases. The war in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina was a by-product of Yugoslavia's collapse and the borders created 
there are a result of the policy of ethnic cleansing. The "Republika Srpska" entity
97 State Department, Press Release, January 27,1999
99 Marc Weller, "The Rambolliet Conference on Kosovo", International Affairs, vol.75, no.2, April 
1999, pp. 211-252
99 Capllan, International Affairs, vol.74,no.4, Oct. 1988
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did not possess the status of an internal republics with historically defined borders 
while in the case of Kosova the conflict between the Serbs and Albanians dates as 
far back as 1912.100 Besides, the borders of Kosova have been more or less 
historically defined and its people possess a history of national unity, which was 
recognised by the Yugoslav Constitutions of 1946 and 1974. Although it was not 
granted the same official title, that of republic, its borders were demarcated along 
historical lines to acknowledge the historical unity of the Albanian people of 
Kosova. These borders could not be changed without the approval of the 
Parliament of Kosova. 101
Kosova with the possession of territorial connection which has remained constant 
for much of the past 1.000 years and on the basis of possession of a distinct 
identity based on their shared national heritage, culture, language and ethnicity, 
should have a right to self-determination. This position is enhanced by the 
dissolution of the Yugoslavia, since the United States and other major powers have 
explicitly declined to recognize the self-proclaimed FRY as the continuity of 
former Yugoslavia.
The self-determination of the Kosova/o would helped the democratization of 
Serbia, that is, one of the aims of the policy of the West. In this way the Serbs 
would have been helped to establish a state without national problems, national 
hatreds and Serbophobia. It is our view as well that the "Serbs have to learn to five 
without others within their national state.102 It seems that the saying of a Chinese
100 John M. Fraser, "The Kosovo Quagmire, What Are the Issues? Should We Care?” International 
Journal, vol. LIII, no.4,4 Autumn 1998, www.ciia.org/ii. htm
101 Constitution of 1974, art.5, ( see for more www. intl-crisis-group,org.9 November, Intermediate 
Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolution of the Kosovo Crises); Noel Malcolm, "Is Kosovo Real? The 
Battle Over History Continues", Foreign Affairs, January, February 1999,vol.78,no.l
102 Self-Determination and International Recognition Policy, Yugoslavia-History 1992, World
107
ruler, Ching the First, that "before there can be brilliant change, there must be 
chaos” perfectly fits the Kosovar Albanian tragedy.
Affairs,Summer 97,vol. 160, Issuel.p. 17, www.epnet.com
CONCLUSION
To analyze the origins of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, one has to deal with the 
very origins of the creation of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, or the first 
Yugoslavia. As in other parts of Eastern Europe, state building at the time was 
carried out within the framework of national ideologies which served as a primary 
instrument of mass mobilization. In the early twentieth century, separate national 
ideologies created the new Kingdom. The act of its formation in 1918 was 
contrary to the liberal and democratic concepts. The northern parts of the new 
state ( Slovenia and Croatia) struggled for the confederate type of the common 
constitutive groups of Serbs-Croats and Slovenes. While the center and the 
southern part of the state, that is, the Serbs considered that the state should be 
centralized and led by the Serbs. These fore, .the new state was considered as a 
continuation of a prewar Kingdom of Serbia.
The Serbs considered their nation dominant for the reason that they had liberated 
their territories from the Ottoman Empire and than during the Balkan Wars they 
had stretched their territories including the territories of today’s Macedonia and 
Kosova/o. This fact ignited the Serbs to aspire to become the dominant force of the 
new state that would lead, being the dominant power of the Balkans to, the goals 
set in the programs of Ilija Garasanin (1844). In the framework of this state other 
groups living in the Kingdom were treated as a second-class citizens, while some 
non-Slavic populations were not even regarded as minorities. This was the case 
with the Albanians as a whole who were totally discriminated against in the pre­
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war Yugoslavia. Dissatisfaction as to how the state should be influenced the 
discriminated groups to organize themselves and to cooperate with each other in 
order to oppose the Serb hegemony. The dissolution of the first Yugoslavia come 
about when Germany invaded Poland and the Yugoslav government signed 
Tripartite Pact, and went to exile. The first Yugoslav state broke-up in a civil war 
and witch led some to conclude that it was not a vital one.
During the war all the ethnic oriented political groups lost their credibility with the 
massacres that they committed, the only viable option that was left was Tito with 
his comrades promising that the national question will be solved in the rightful 
manner. This promise paved the way to possibility of the recruitment of all the 
ethnic groups, including the Albanians and the Hungarians, into the administration. 
The national question of Albanians was to be resolved at the time by the CPY , but 
it was not. Kosova/o remained a province within Serbia. Tito was pro-Yugoslav 
and he was afraid of Serbian nationalism, but at the same time he needed to gain 
the Serb sympathy because he was seen by Serbs with skepticism. From the outset 
the federation was centralized, the way that fitted to the Serbs. With the election of 
Rankovic 1966, (Serb origin minister of interior) the Serbs were provided with the 
possibility to exercise their influence over Kosova/o, Vojvodina, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro. Tito and the CPY (Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia) considered that the "brotherhood and unity", and equal status for all 
nations of Yugoslavia would solve the problem of national question. From 1963 
more liberal breath and more liberal thoughts were heard, considering that 
decision-making process had to shift away from the party toward citizens.
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When communist national elite's consolidated their grip on power in the six 
republics, it was possible to change the constitution for more liberalism. The 1974 
constitution created a semiconfederation of semisovereign republics. In these 
changes Kosova/o gained all the prerogatives of a republic. The wide autonomy 
granted to Kosova/o offered the Kosovar Albanians an opportunity to check and 
balance Serbia's aggressive behavior that marked State-running of former 
Yugoslavia all the time until its dissolution. With the new position of Kosova/o in 
the balance-of-power politics for a while stopped centralist policy of Belgrade, 
which had earlier resulted in assimilation and denationalization of Albanians, 
Muslims and Macedonians. In Tito's Yugoslavia as well, national ideologies were 
manifested by the national elites, but Tito intervened. We could say that Tito, 
CPY,and JNA (Yugoslav Army of People’s) were the three key components that 
held the country together. External threat from the Soviet Union after 1968, also 
contributed to the holding of Yugoslavia together.
With the changes of 1974 constitution, the republics were granted with self­
administration, so it was passed from the vertical links on to that of horizontal one. 
All these republics inside their territory contain minorities of other nationalities. As 
long as the republics were endowed with the new position, they started to be 
identified with the majority nation. Especially this form of identification appeared 
in the late 80s, while other groups were seen as the obstacle toward the realization 
and determination of self - identity inside their territories. This system directed 
under the slogan o f " brotherhood and unity" was seen as another barrier in the way 
of their national aspiration. The communist federation on the other hand could not 
have been sufficient to satisfy the demands for greater autonomy, and was what the
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Albanians were looking for in the demonstrations of 1981. Yet, Kosova/o was 
sacrificed by the Slavic republics of former Yugoslavia.
Besides national ideologies that dominated the scene after Tito's death, self­
management as an instrument, created to distinguish the socialist Yugoslav system 
from the other socialist system, lost its value. From the outset it was applied in the 
practice with the attitude that the worker should decide for the work and results of 
the work. In practice it turned out to be the opposite of that, in as much as the 
worker was needed to attend the meetings and vote at the end of meeting, though 
the management of the enterprises especially after the 70s were in the hands of 
local or regional politicians. But this was yet, another factor that led to the further 
tensions in the overall structure of the society, since the instrument of self­
management in the absence of political democracy proved to be fatal.
Self-management had a direct impact on the stagnation of the economy, and at the 
late of 80s brought about total collapse. Situation was worsened by 1989 when the 
inflation become very high, 893.8%. With the new moderate Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic, economy started to revive, but the appearance of Milosevic in the scene 
from 1987, and his playing with nationalist card rendered the reforms led by Croat 
Ante Markovic impossible. The fact that witnessed that Yugoslav crises were not 
of an economic nature any more, but of a political one. After Milosevic came in 
the scene with the abolishment of constitution of Kosova/o and Vojvodina, and 
with the idea of creating "Greater Serbia", as it was foreseen in the Memorandum 
of 1987. The Serbs began to display aggressive nationalism. They began to talk 
about settling every thing with the use of arms. Appearance of Serb nationalism, 
was to dominate Yugoslav politics in during the late 80s. In one way or another
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provoked other nationalism’s as well. The main feature of all the national 
ideologies of the time was obsession with the nation and the territory. With the 
domination of nationalism as a national ideology, Yugoslavia had now entered the 
new phase toward the dissolution.
The national ideology become a driving force in all the republics, in the first 
multiparty elections in 1990, whereby new national elite's, promoting the national 
ideologies of the " dominant nation" type, came to power in each of the six 
republics. In all of them the main aim was to consolidate the new nation-states, the 
process that was interrupted at the beginning of twentieth century, with the creation 
of the common state of the South Slavs. Therefore, the causes of the dissolution we 
found in the first multiparty elections, whereby the republics were striving for new 
identities, were related to the international environment that had changed with the 
fall of Berlin wall, and the new policies pursued by Gorbachev. Internal conditions 
and the external ones, created the possibility for the republics to pursue their 
independent way, not to continue within the artificial unity, especially after 
Milosevic came to power in Serbia.
That was how the new elite mobilized their peoples in endorsing their independent 
states, but the mobilization proved that national ideologies of the Serbs, Croats, 
Bosnjac Muslims, Albanians and Macedonians were in conflict with each other 
regarding the territorial demands. The efforts for the transformation of the state of 
Yugoslavia failed, for the intentions of republics that were diametrically antipodal. 
For that matter, Slovenia and Croatia continued with the proclamation of the 
independence. In a response, Serbia continued its policies with violent means, 
that is by conducting the war against those opposing it. International community
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did not intervened, since the Western Governments preferred a common 
constitutional framework for all of them. This Western approach to the conflict 
offered Milosevic a wide opportunity to attack one by one others republic first 
Slovenia, than Croatia and most disastrously Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EC 
Conference held in London in 1992 proved to be illusory. It should be admitted 
that in accepting the former internal borders as state borders, the European 
Community backed the territorial claims of the Slovene, Croat and Bosnian 
Muslim national ideologies while denying the same claim of the ruling Serb 
national ideology to the Serb populated areas outside the republic of Serbia. 
This was a clear signal to the Serbia that it would not be allowed to legalize 
their policy of ethnic cleansing, for achieving their political aims, that is " Greater 
Serbia".
In a formal way the establishment of nation states were approved but the 
European Unión and the US administration were not prepared to commit their 
armed forces to enforce the independence of these the newly recognized states, 
instead the EU and the UN attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement between 
the Serb political leaders and the newly recognized governments. This way of 
handling the war did not produce any results, nor did it stop the fighting in the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alliance of the Croats and Bosniac Muslims helped them to 
conquer formerly Serb-held areas in Croatia, and large areas of Western Bosnia, 
expelling Serb population as well. It was the first diplomatic breakthrough in 1995 
after the 3,5 years war, that brought about the peace process signed in November 
1995( Dayton Agreement). As during the history, these territories have never been 
partitioned in a peaceful way to satisfy all the national elites involved, this time as
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well Dayton Peace Agreement failed to satisfy the territorial claims of either the 
Bosnian Muslims or of the Bosnian Serb elites.
In the process of dissolution of former Yugoslavia, just as the other republics, 
Kosova/o strove for its independence statehood. Its majority population and the 
state structures declared Kosova/o as a republic ( Declaration of 2 July 1990 
and the Constitution of September 1990 respectively). Based on these acts, 
Kosova/o held its referendum for independence in September 1991 and asked for 
international recognition of its independent statehood. The request of Kosova/o, 
submitted on 20 December 1991, was not met positively by the then EC 
Conference on Yugoslavia. The answer was tha t" provinces are not endowed with 
sovereignty". The common justification was that it would be a precedent for the 
future and would encourage the forces of separation. In turn, it might have an 
impact on shattering the fragile peace of Dayton. The fact is that, Kosova/o was 
different, and that could not be compared to the Serbian entities created violently 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Difference, first of all was based on 
demographic argument, Kosova/o is populated with 90% of Albanians. And the 
second argument why Kosova/o is different, is that the borders created in the " 
Republika Srpska" entity were created violently by ethnically cleansing the non- 
Serb population, and that this borders did not posses the status of an international 
republics with historically defined borders, while in the case of Kosova/o, 
possession of the territorial connection has remained constant for much of the past. 
Therefore, the independence of Kosova/o would help for the future, the national 
ideologies would not be used as the principal instrument of political mobilization 
in the Balkans. And the Serbs would live within their own national state.
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